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9INTERDEPENDENCE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY
1  Description and goals of the 
interdependence of internal and 
external security -project
The objective of the Ministry of the Interior's research project on the interdependence 
of internal and external security has been to establish an in-depth understanding of 
the interdependence of internal and external security, which has become closer with 
the change in the international operational environment, and to prepare concrete 
action proposals and recommendations for the development of the operational 
prerequisites and cooperation of the security actors. The project has been closely 
connected with the internal security strategy currently being prepared. Particular 
attention has been paid in the preparation of the project to the strategic focus areas 
brought up in the internal security report, and the interfaces to the examination of the 
security context comprising both internal and external security. The project has been 
implemented in cross-administration cooperation between the sectors of the Ministry 
of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
The goals of the nterdependence of internal and external security project have been to 
assess the strengths and challenges of the current state of international operations and, 
related to this, to analyse the interfaces and interdependence of internal and external 
security and to create concrete action proposals and development recommendations 
concerning the links between internal and external security. The project work has 
reinforced the shared view of the administrative branch of the Ministry of the Interior 
of international operations as one of the strategic key tasks of internal security, and has 
drawn up proposals for specifying the key tasks, coordination responsibility, and division 
of duties and authority related to internal security in more detail, and for reducing the 
legislative obstacles related to international cooperation. 
During the initiation of the project, a goal to define and clarify the terminology related 
to the interdependence of internal and external security was also set. As the project 
processing went forward, the goal in question was not considered to be central with 
respect to the examination of the causes of phenomena in the interface between internal 
and external security. This does not remove the need to define and clarify the terminology, 
for example, in connection with the preparation of the internal security strategy.
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2  Focus areas and development 
perspectives that arose based on the 
project's background materials and 
expert interviews 
2.1  The interdependence of internal and external security 
based on key policy documents  
The interdependence of internal and external security was examined in relation to the 
emphases and policy definitions of key national and EU-level policy documents in the 
security context. Particular attention has been paid to the examination of the policy 
definitions in recent strategic documents – finalised in 2016 – such as the internal 
security report, the Government's foreign and security policy report, and important 
documents finalised previously, such as the Security Strategy for Society (2010). Of the 
EU policy documents, in particular the emphases of the European Agenda on Security 
(2015) and the EU Global Strategy (2016) were taken into consideration. The materials 
used in the examinations are limited, but they do provide a sufficiently accurate idea of 
the interdependence of internal and external security, and provide a background for the 
creation of the project's development recommendations.
The development of the security environment, highlighting the close connection between 
internal and external security, is a key focus in the internal security report prepared for the 
first time, commissioned by the current cabinet. The objective of the internal security 
report is to establish a core frame of reference for overall security, together with the 
foreign and security policy report, and the defence report 
that is to be issued later. The internal security report 
will define the direction of the operations of internal 
affairs actors and bring up the required measures and 
prioritisation needs in resourcing and official duties for 
operating in the new security context. 
The most significant change in security 
has occurred in the factors affecting 
Finland's security outside the national 
borders, and operating regardless of the 
exact borders.
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The internal security report emphasises the dramatic change in the security environment, 
where internal and external security are very deeply interlaced with each other. The most 
significant change in security has occurred in the factors affecting Finland's security 
beyond its national borders. Major drivers of change in the development of the global 
security context have been, in particular, the violent extremism in the Middle East and 
Africa, terrorism and the strengthening of extremist 
organisations such as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant) born in Syria and Iraq, and in addition to these 
regions, the strong flow of immigrants into Europe 
generated by wars and insufficient livelihoods in Central 
Asia. The development of the security environment is 
also significantly affected by security challenges related 
to organised cross-border crime, hybrid phenomena, and 
cybersecurity.  
The rapidity and increasing complexity emblematic of the development of the security 
environment as a whole highlight the importance of internal security and make it more 
complicated to operate in the security environment. It is critical for the security actors 
to attempt to anticipate the development and to analyse the related phenomena 
with multifaceted causations more proactively and comprehensively. Analysing and 
responding to the development must take into consideration that, in addition to the 
authorities, responsibility for creating internal security lies with many other parties 
producing security for society through well-being, such as the business sector, social 
and health care, and educational institutes. When security operations are examined as a 
whole, the development and harmonisation of the dialogue between national and 
international actors and cooperation models are necessary to answer the challenges of 
security development. 
The internal security report lays the foundation for the internal security strategy to be 
created. The strategy defines the strategic policies and focus areas for internal security 
based on a wide security perspective. The preparatory work for the internal security 
strategy emphasises a cross-administration implementation method that creates 
the prerequisites for the broad integration into the strategy process of perspectives and 
approaches with a key impact on the security of society. Strategic interior security requires 
commitment in and ability for in-depth cooperation, in accordance with the broad 
security viewpoint, with the different authorities, business actors, the third sector, or 
associations, educational institutes, and several other actors. Prospects of deepening 
the cooperation between actors affecting security will be taken into consideration during 
the drafting of the far-reaching internal security strategy and the update of the Security 
Strategy for Society.
The development and harmonisation 
of the dialogue between national and 
international actors and cooperation 
models are necessary to answer the 
challenges of security development.
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The increasing connection between internal and external 
security also receives central and crosscutting emphasis in 
the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Report (2016). 
The foreign and security policy context is based on the 
logic of interdependence of the phenomena, when states 
and other actors are bound to each other more tightly with 
multifaceted causations, and depend on each other in their 
development. Correspondingly, changes in the foreign and security policy context have 
multifaceted effects on Finland's internal development, including security development 
(Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, 2016.)
The strong and continuous change in the security environment is characteristic in both 
Finland and its neighbouring areas, as in the global perspective. The change factors 
and actors are becoming more heterogeneous, the mutual interaction and power 
relationships are changing constantly, and anticipating future development is more 
challenging than before. As a result of these development dynamics, uncertainty-
generating factors in internal security will increase, and the importance of society's 
resilience, or general crisis tolerance, increases. As a consequence of the rapidity of the 
development, information on the variables of the operational environment and the 
resulting opportunities and threats must be constantly updated and analysed, and there 
must be the ability to anticipate and, if necessary, adapt the strategic focus points of the 
operations and the operations themselves, based on this information. 
According to the foreign and security policy report, the inseparability of internal and 
external security is concretised particularly in connection with trends that significantly 
change the global foreign and security policy operating environment, such as widespread 
immigration, which combines, in various compositions, the factors generating 
immigration – strong population growth, differences in standards of living, poor level of 
human rights and democracy, and military conflicts (e.g. Africa). From the perspective of 
the recipient country, widespread and uncontrolled immigration involves internal security 
risks through, for example, terrorism, crime, and radical xenophobic movements. Global 
risks and threats concerning peace and security, the socio-economic stability of societies, 
and the state of the environment correspondingly require definition of the problems on 
a global level, and more varied cooperation with practices suited to rapid change, in 
order to control and anticipate global challenges cross-cutting society.
The inseparability of internal and external security is also concretised as a consequence 
of the increasing complexity of the means of warfare. In addition to military means, 
national interests are advanced by coordinated non-military means of warfare in various 
combinations, such as political and economic pressure, forms of information and cyber 
warfare, and other means of hybrid influence, with the combined goal of creating 
The change factors and actors are 
becoming more heterogeneous, 
the mutual interaction and power 
relationships are changing constantly, 
and anticipating future development is 
more challenging than before.
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pressure, uncertainty, instability, and damage to the stability 
and safety of the society being targeted. In accordance 
with the overall security analysis, it is key to identify the 
early forms of hybrid influence; for this reason, increasing 
competence is required of the actors in identifying hybrid 
influences and developing the required capabilities and 
cybersecurity in cooperation with national and international 
actors.
The Security Strategy for Society has been prepared 
from the perspective of securing the vital functions of society, and when examined 
with this approach in mind, it emphasises the wide scope of the security viewpoint 
and the increase in the interdependence of national and international dimensions 
as a result of globalisation (Security Strategy for Society, 2010). Security challenges 
and threats increasingly cross national borders and have an extensive impact 
and, correspondingly, comprehensiveness and cross-administration examination are 
emphasised in the assessment of the development of the security environment. A 
stronger integration of the different actors in society, such as businesses and non-
governmental organisations, is therefore needed for the preparedness of society 
and the management of disruptions. 
Businesses have a central position particularly in the economy, infrastructure, and 
internationalisation of society, and cooperation focusing on these core functions between 
the public and private sectors plays a key role in the development of the security of 
society and the related preparedness. Organisations based on volunteering play an 
important societal role, particularly in preparedness, implementing security practices 
and reinforcing crisis resilience. In their areas of 
competence, these organisations are a major resource 
complementing the activities of the authorities, and a 
layer reinforcing the resilience of society, the strength of 
which culminates in the ability to identify needs on an 
individual level and to effectively connect to national 
and international networks. 
It is important for operating in the changed security environment that the security 
actors exercise their influence and work in active cooperation with international 
actors. In accordance with the National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management (2014), 
civilian crisis management is one of the key tools of internal security work in an 
external environment, where experts work in conflict areas to solve global and cross-
border security problems (National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management, 2014). The 
operational environments of civilian crisis management have become more complex and 
Comprehensiveness and cross-
administration examination are 
emphasised in the assessment of the 
development of the security environment, 
as is the required stronger integration 
of the different actors in society, such 
as businesses and non-governmental 
organisations, in the work being done 
on the preparedness of society and the 
management of disruptions.
Civilian crisis management is a practical 
example of internal security work in an 
external environment, where internal 
security experts work in conflict areas to 
solve global and cross-border problems. 
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challenging, and the development of the operational environments highlights the 
strong interdependence of internal and external security. The primary targets in the 
operational environment are fragile states, where the reduced operational capacity and 
legitimacy are a result of, for example, uneven socio-economic development, a lack of 
democracy and human rights, and the non-functioning of the constitutional state. The 
situation in these fragile states generates negative development, where the problems 
escalate into wider conflicts and humanitarian crises with effects reaching increasingly 
further and wider beyond the immediate birthplace of the problems via widespread 
population movement, for example. The societal instability and inability to provide 
security, justice, and economic development supporting the welfare of the fragile states 
creates a potential growth place for terrorism, organised crime, and extremism, 
through which the development will have a negative and multifaceted effect on the 
global security situation. 
Civilian crisis management is used to develop, in particular, problem prevention and 
management competence of the countries in conflict, and to prevent the growth and 
spread of security problems beyond these regions. Activities during crisis management 
and its aftermath require a comprehensive perspective in order to fit civilian crisis 
management together with military crisis management, development cooperation, 
and humanitarian aid actors so that a sustainable overall impact can be reached for 
society to become whole and personal security to be achieved. Managing this for civilian 
crisis management activities requires the actors to have a clear and flexible division 
of work, coordinated cooperation, and a comprehensive flow of information. In 
order to promote an all-encompassing civilian crisis management approach and to 
develop the resources, the interdependence of internal and external security is taken into 
consideration more comprehensively both nationally and 
in the target regions (Security Strategy for Society, 2010, 
National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management, 2014). 
The intertwining of the security of Europe and the conflict 
areas outside it, and the emphasis on the all-encompassing 
nature of conflict management are also key elements of the 
priorities of the European Union Global Strategy (European 
Union Global Strategy, 2016). 
The Security Strategy for Society emphasises the importance of situational awareness 
shared and jointly formed by the security actors based on essential information and 
estimates for anticipating, preparing for, and responding to threats and disturbances. 
Situational awareness in the security development that is more integral to the 
international operational environment requires rapid and up-to-date information sharing 
and utilisation in the networks formed of national and international actors. Global security 
challenges such as terrorism, organised crime, and cybercrime require the development 
Global security challenges such 
as terrorism, organised crime, and 
cybercrime require the development of 
a comprehensive information exchange 
architecture
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of a comprehensive information exchange architecture; work on this is currently being 
expedited at the EU-level, for instance. 
Forming situational awareness is supported by situational awareness arrangements in 
which the expertise of different sectors is combined into a comprehensive depiction of 
the prevailing conditions, the operational readiness of the different actors, the event 
chains created by a disturbance or a threat, and information and development estimates 
integrally related to the event process. Procedurally examined, forming situational 
awareness means a multi-stage process to organise the surrounding "information 
space" in such a manner that the collected and analysed information can be interpreted 
and distributed in a timely and effective manner to the actors who need it. Forming 
strategic situational awareness, intended for the long-term examination of the security 
environment, and operational situational awareness supporting the rapid assessment 
of the situation require systematically created cooperation models and harmonised 
technical solutions and management at both the national and international level. 
It is essential that threat and disturbance-related decisions on immediate measures 
and longer-term development measures required, based on an assessment of future 
development, can be made based on reliable and up-to-date situational awareness. Up-
to-date and effective information exchange and forming of situational awareness are 
central when combating and preventing the impacts of phenomena such as cybercrime 
on critical functions of society and reinforcing the resilience of society (Finland's National 
Cyber Security Strategy, 2013).
The increasingly pronounced transformation of the security environment into a single 
whole encompassing both internal and external security phenomena is also brought up in 
European-level key strategic documents, such as the European Union Global Strategy 
(2016) and the European internal security strategies for 2015–2020 and 2010–2014 
(European Agenda on Security, 2015, European Union Internal Security Strategy, 2010). 
The EU Global Strategy emphasises the closer intertwining of internal and external 
security. The EU aims to improve its security by, for example, stepping up its fight against 
terrorism and cybercrime, reinforcing cybersecurity, ensuring the functioning of critical 
infrastructure such as the energy production sector, and preventing crises and conflicts 
in fragile states before they escalate into more widespread violence. The current security 
development requires the actors to have a wide angle of approach and multipartite 
cooperation in order to meet the challenges. 
In June 2015, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council approved the revised EU internal 
security strategy for 2015–2020, or the European Agenda for Security. The three focus 
areas of the strategy are:
16
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 − preventing terrorism, radicalisation leading to terrorism, and the 
recruitment and funding of terrorism; reinforced border security; 
integration of external and internal dimensions related to fighting 
terrorism;
 − preventing serious and organised crime based on the EU policy cycle; 
and
 − preventing and combating cybercrime and promoting cybersecurity.
All three strategic focus areas interlink the internal 
and external security dimensions with multifaceted 
causations and require the holistic approach to issues 
related to internal security emphasised by the Council in 
its conclusions. Measures considered to be particularly 
important include improving information exchange and 
availability; strengthening operational cooperation; more effective prevention and 
investigation of crimes and terrorist attacks; increasing education, funding, research, and 
innovation opportunities; and the development and availability of secure information and 
communications technology.
The first European internal security strategy for 2010–2014 states that internal 
security and its development is increasingly dependent on the state and 
development of external security (EU Internal Security Strategy - national follow-up 
measures, 2014). The strategy emphasises the widespread and all-encompassing nature 
of internal security, which comprises both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Internal 
security as a whole encompasses threats affecting the life, safety, and well-being of 
citizens in a very complex and multi-dimensional manner, including natural and man-
made catastrophes such as extreme weather phenomena and widespread forest fires. 
Due to the mutual causality of the scope and formation mechanisms of threats, multi-
level cooperation between the authorities of different security sectors is essential, 
with a joint approach complementing and reinforcing the ability to guarantee security and 
stability in an environment where the challenges exceed national, bilateral, or regional 
preparedness. At the operational cooperation level, this means the development of 
flexible operational models that enable the realisation of the cooperation-based synergy 
in the anticipation of, preparedness for, prevention of, and response to security 
threats, regardless of state borders, differing legislation, and methods of working. Key 
tools for developing cooperation include threat anticipation through the analysis of 
future situations and scenarios, systematic planning of countermeasures sufficient with 
respect to preparedness and review of the consequences, and development of models 
and practices concerning the operational side of the cooperation, for instance with regard 
to the operational models of central actors with coordination responsibility (e.g. Europol, 
Eurojust, Frontex, counterterrorism coordinator) and through measures promoting 
The operations of security actors are 
required to be agile in following and 
adapting to the rapid change in the 
security environment.
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information sharing and joint investigations and operations. The operations of security 
actors, including cooperation procedures, are required to be agile in following and 
adapting to the rapid change in the security environment. Flexible methods enable 
the real-time monitoring of developing changes in the security context, and the taking 
into account of rising threats and risks that could cause larger-scale security problems as 
drivers of strategic planning and operations.  
2.2  The interdependence of internal and external security 
based on expert interviews
The interdependence of internal and external security-
project collected viewpoints and development proposals 
related to the interdependence by interviewing key security 
experts representing the internal affairs administration, 
the Parliament's Administration Committee, the President's 
Office, and university research. According to the experts, 
internal and external security cannot be divided into 
separate sectors in the current operational environment; 
instead, the internal and external security dimensions are 
intertwined in a global security environment full of interdependencies. Correspondingly, 
a wide-angle approach and the aim to perceive and assess causations in a multi-faceted 
manner are essential in the examination of the interdependence of internal and external 
security, and in this respect, an analysis aiming at exact definitions of security criteria, for 
example, is outside the focus area of the examination. 
Defining the threats in the current security environment requires an open-minded 
and creative approach, where the interactions of phenomena affecting security are 
interpreted using a multi-science approach and the reflection of the interactions in 
the development of the security environment across the board. The examinations 
take phenomena with global impacts into consideration across the board, interpreted 
based on their causality. Phenomena with a significant impact on the global security 
environment include terrorism, violent extremism, serious organised crime, cybercrime, 
and hybrid phenomena, where the hybrid dimension threats refer to influencing security 
by a variety of means with multi-level causations, such as military and political influence 
and influencing strategic information systems. A hybrid phenomenon is an example of a 
phenomenon with a significant impact on the development of the security environment, 
the scale of which has grown with public discussion, although as a phenomenon, hybrid 
threats have existed for a long time (Salonius-Pasternak and Limnéll, 2015). 
A wide-angle approach and aim to 
perceive and assess the causations in a 
multi-faceted manner are essential in the 
examination of the interdependence of 
internal and external security. Defining 
the threats to the security environment 
requires an open-minded and creative 
approach.
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The common factor in all the different phenomena in the 
security context is that they affect all security actors and 
societal sectors regardless of the observer or the selected 
angle of approach. Correspondingly, the definition of the 
acuteness of these phenomena stems from how directly 
their impacts are reflected in the state and development 
of internal security. Examination of security-related phenomena must thus take into 
consideration their interdependence and widespread societal impacts as different 
dimensions of the same examination space rather than as separate cause-effect 
chains of events. It is also essential to examine analytically the phenomenon-specific 
formation mechanisms of the threats and risks, and based on them, to create the most 
purposeful operational models for responding to the threats and risks, and anticipating 
the expected development. Development measures along these lines will form the 
foundation of the recommendation for further development identified in the project. 
Work performed within the framework of different segments of society, such as business, 
education, and voluntary organisational activities, must be understood as an 
important part of the well-being of society and a force maintaining and fostering 
security.
Many different levels can be identified in the examinations of internal and external 
security. Conceptually, internal security has meant the national security issues of 
European countries, and foreign relations have had ripple effects on the state of internal 
security and its development. With regard to defence policy, the examinations have 
concentrated on whether the common interface is based 
on cooperation or more in-depth forms of connection. 
The interdependence of internal and external security can 
manifest itself in many different security-related contexts, 
such as in the examination of child abductions or border-
crossing traffic on the Finnish-Russian border. On the other 
hand, the exact definitions of the internal and external 
security dimension for an individual citizen are not the focus of the examination; what is 
important are the security issues in areas with a concrete impact on subjective security, 
such as the family community, livelihood, education, free time, Internet applications, and 
so on. 
From the perspective of managing the complex overall picture of security, the essential 
things are the overall importance of activities affecting security and the ripple effect 
in the production of internal security. The focal point of the examinations is taking 
care of the overall chain and developing solution models built on a foundation 
of extensive common understanding. The development needs are connected to 
information exchange, formation of a shared vision and goals, forming a shared situational 
Taking care of the overall chain of security 
and developing solution models built 
on a foundation of extensive common 
understanding lie at the focal point.
The common factor in all the different 
phenomena in the security context is that 
they affect all security actors and societal 
sectors regardless of the observer or the 
selected angle of approach.
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awareness, and fitting operational activities together. 
Civilian crisis management operations are an excellent 
example of concrete security work, in which multi-sector 
cooperation based on a common understanding 
between national and international actors is central 
for repairing the societally fragile state of things and 
preventing the spread of security threats. 
In the examinations of the complex security frame of reference and the conclusions drawn 
thereof, security authorities are required to have breadth and ability for perception 
across the borders of operational sectors and creative, solution-oriented "out of the 
box" thinking and action. Dialogue along the borders of the administrative branches, 
with the intention of examining the phenomena and responding to the challenges, will, 
in the long term, inevitably mean the narrowing of the perspective. Action proposals 
with respect to the development of the operational culture include a general, more 
effective awareness among internal security authorities with respect to the state of 
society and its development, and the dismantling of unnecessary silos between sectors 
and interpretations tied to authority. These pre-development changes will promote 
an operational culture, at the core of which lie the systematic analysis of issues and 
phenomena, the solution-oriented approach emphasised in the development of 
solution methods, and cooperation across sector borders. 
The cross-cutting element of the measures supporting a new operational culture is the 
cooperation between multiple authorities aiming at anticipation and preparedness, 
and practices supporting this will continue to be recommended development measures 
in the future. There is usually a long, systemic link from the response to a security threat to 
the root causes of the threat's formation process, and in a systemic-level examination of 
security operations, this means a systematic analysis of the points where interventions 
could affect the development of the situation before the escalation of the threat. 
Examination of security threats must take their strong interdependence into consideration 
(the so-called threats on a tablecloth model: when you pull one edge of the tablecloth, 
the entire tablecloth moves and you pull the entire tablecloth off the table). Sitra's 
"flagging model" (Sitra reports 83, 2014), intended to prevent the development of the 
marginalisation of youths, is an example of proactive cooperation between multiple 
authorities. It is based on the identification of the situation of a youth in danger of 
becoming marginalised as early as possible through observations ("flagging") made by 
the key authorities handling the case. By flagging, the authorities indicate their worry 
concerning the development of the youth's situation, 
and the authorities who flagged the youth are brought 
together to form a shared situational awareness and 
discuss the solution. In this procedure, the authorities 
Responding to challenges affecting 
the security context requires measures 
supporting unofficial networking and 
lines of dialogue.
In the examinations of the complex 
security frame of reference and the 
conclusions drawn thereof, security 
authorities are required to have breadth 
and ability of perception across the 
borders of operational sectors, and 
creative, solution-oriented thinking and 
action.
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cooperate beyond their own, actual field even before the customer's situation has 
escalated into a set of problems with a wide-ranging impact. This operational model also 
guarantees the protection of the youth's privacy until the point where several authorities 
have "flagged" the youth. 
The need for cooperation across administrative borders in 
order to respond comprehensively to challenges affecting 
the security context requires, in practice, an action 
proposal that supports unofficial networking and lines 
of dialogue, such as information exchange teams that 
are supported by the organisation. Communications and 
information exchange at different levels are promoted by systematic measures, and 
the need for a systematic approach is related to, for example, preparedness and the 
discussions required to build it up – discussions on threats, the models for preparing for 
them, the approach methods, and their up-to-dateness within and between organisations. 
Recommended tools for forming shared situational awareness include scenario work 
and, in addition to trends in the security environment, procedures for identifying and 
interpreting early warning signals and black swans.
The action recommendation for perceiving the complex security context requires the 
development of practices supporting joint vision planning and goal setting with 
respect to strategic planning and operations. Dysfunctionality in the cooperation between 
different security actors stems from a situation in which the actors do not understand 
the common goal and are therefore unable to solve the problem together. When making 
extensive reforms, it is essential to involve different 
parties across the board in the preparation process, and 
in particular, the competence potential of business and 
third-sector actors must be utilised more effectively 
in the reform endeavours. Linking representatives of 
economic life to the authorities’ development projects more 
closely creates a more comprehensive perspective on the 
interactions of the phenomena and subject matter related 
to corporate security. The practices of non-governmental organisations doing wide-
ranging and societally important work are, as a rule, small and agile, and the strength 
of these non-governmental organisations is linked to the development of competence 
promoting everyday security and strengthening of the cohesion of society through 
communal activities.
Responding to the complex challenges and development of the security context 
requires the development of practices related to the shareability and usability 
of meaningful information. The meaningfulness of information is related centrally 
Perceiving the complex security context 
requires the development of procedures 
supporting joint vision planning and goal 
setting.
It is essential to involve different parties 
across the board in the preparation 
process. In particular, the competence 
potential of business and third sector 
actors must be utilised more effectively in 
reform endeavours.
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to systemic development: only meaningful information changes the system and thus 
generates development. The examination perspectives central with regard to meaningful, 
development-generating information are linked to, among other things, the ownership 
of information, its encryptability and confidentiality, legitimisation of the information 
(legitimate security), and, when examined in these contexts, operating models and 
practices with which actors outside the security sector are involved in the discussion on 
the security context and developments in the field. 
The new forms of cooperation and system levels required 
by security development are unable to form without 
communication that enables it and generates new 
meanings. According to Luhmann's resonance concept, 
systems are able to react to the development of their 
environments only according to their own structures (Luhmann, 2004). The complexity 
of the security environment requires increased sensitivity and an outward-facing way 
of acting from the security actors in order to achieve a wide-ranging interpretation. 
A self-referential system could be considered to be the opposite of this way of acting, in 
which parties outside the system are not systematically involved in the discussion, thus 
reinforcing the silo mentality. Complexity and multilayer cause-effect relationships must 
not become justifications for preventing development, and building a new operational 
culture may proceed, for example, as different combinations of experience gained during 
operations and innovative work. 
Shared situational awareness and interpretation, and understanding of the direction 
and strategies, can only be built with the help of active dialogue. The role of 
communications as a strategic component of leadership has traditionally been 
identified and recognised, but active and interactive communications have not necessarily 
been the core strengths of security actors. Communication skills will be further 
emphasised as the world becomes even more complex. In the current form of the 
security context, the contents, responsibilities, and message transmitting mechanisms of 
communications carry significant importance, further emphasised in security disruption 
and threat situations, where communications form an essential part of leadership. In 
disruption and threat situations, rapidly forming real-time situational awareness and 
active, multi-channel communications anticipating 
future developments are a central leadership tool, when 
preventing the formation of an "information void" and the 
spread of disinformation in it, based on assumptions and 
misunderstandings, particularly in social media channels 
that reach a large number of information users efficiently. 
Communications officers of the authorities operating in 
the security sector must take particular care to retain the 
Complexity and multilayer cause-
effect relationships must not prevent 
the development of a new operational 
culture.
Communication skills will be further 
emphasised as the world becomes 
even more complex. Communications 
officers for the authorities operating in 
the security sector must take particular 
care to maintain the believability and 
reliability of their own communications. 
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believability and reliability of their own communications – particularly in situations in 
which the communications are focused on digital channels and the role of social media 
increases. The best safeguard for retaining the impact of one's own communications is 
an active, open, and bold style of communicating, and the development of practices 
promoting this kind of communications culture is recommended through the strategic 
steering of the security actors.
In the rapidly changing security environment, meaningful information must 
effectively reach the actors who need it, and the security authorities must talk with 
each other, or exchange information and coordinate their 
activities. Keeping to the examinations defined by one's 
own administrative branch prevents the formation of 
a horizontal observation perspective, meaning that, 
when viewing things from the bottom of a silo, you cannot 
gain the range of view of a helicopter when examining 
phenomena requiring comprehensiveness and when defining the necessary measures 
(Branders, 2016). Understanding the causal relations of things requires a time investment 
and, from the participants, motivation for the specification process, as a quick and 
superficial examination will confirm the interpretation of information carried out within 
the framework of sector borders, thus reinforcing the silo mentality of the processing and 
interpreting of information.
Effective information exchange and functioning dialogue between the different security 
actors, particularly the Finnish Defence Forces, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Police, 
and the Border Guard, enables up-to-date and future-oriented situational awareness to 
be formed in a coordinated manner, based on the instances of sector-specific situational 
awareness formed by the different security actors. The norms 
covering information exchange must be in order so that, for 
example, key security actors are able to exchange meaningful 
information with regard to forming shared situational 
awareness. With regard to practices concerning the shareability 
and usability of information, we present a development 
proposal concerning procedures for restricting information 
based more on need, so that documents, for example, are not 
classified as restricted or secret using justifications that are too superficial. These practices 
often stem from old and established organisational practices, and there is plenty of work 
to be done on developing the operational culture in this regard.
Up-to-date situational awareness is a prerequisite for the anticipation of development 
and goal-oriented measures, because future development is assessed through up-to-
date situational awareness. In security operations, one must be able to prepare and 
In the rapidly changing security 
environment, meaningful information 
must effectively reach the actors who 
need it.
In security operations, one must be 
able to prepare and anticipate. The 
immigration phenomenon, for example, 
has proven that joint anticipation at a 
European level does not yet function.
23
INRIKESMINISTERIETS PUBLIKATION 37/2016 INTERDEPENDENCE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY
anticipate, and the extent of the immigration phenomenon, for example, has proven 
that joint anticipation at the European level does not yet function. The ability to detect 
and interpret early warning signals is essential for the evaluation of the development 
of the security environment, such as the development of new security threats, and 
this requires further improvements in communication, 
and the formation of shared meanings between the 
security actors. Risks concerning the security environment 
cannot be communicated as specifically as threats; 
correspondingly, they are also more difficult to interpret 
and take into consideration in decision-making. The 
development proposal is to strive to understand security 
more systematically and, correspondingly, to develop 
security threat and risk management to be more 
systematic. One of the key challenges in the current operational culture is its detail-
focused examination of threats and risks, which fails to provide the all-encompassing 
perspective required in decision-making.
Society in its current form, and the security context as one element of it, should be seen 
from a perspective where the borders between internal and external security become 
blurred, just like the structural differences between the security actors and the sectors. 
Security issues should, as a rule, be examined as processes and systems, making it 
easier to place new phenomena and security challenges in the complex overall picture, 
the "security process chart", and enabling a wider understanding of their causation. This 
is a so-called intelligent, adaptive, and complex security system (Branders 2016), in 
which the issue rather than the author is central. The new security system can provide 
the prerequisites for redefining authority and competence and, in the same overall 
picture, can help identify phenomena that the security actors have not been accustomed 
to handling in the same "shared" context. Based on these observations, operating models 
are presented as a development recommendation that steers the different actors towards 
preparing adaptive strategies promoting the overall picture.
Security issues should, as a rule, be 
examined as processes and systems, 
making it easier to place new phenomena 
and security challenges in the complex 
overall picture, enabling a wider 
understanding of their causation.
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4  Views of the sectors on the 
interdependence of internal and 
external security and development 
recommendations
In February 2015, the sectors of the Ministry of the Interior made the statements included 
in this document concerning the interdependence of internal and external security, the 
international cooperation of the sectors, and concrete development recommendations 
for the development of the internal affairs administration, taking the interdependence 
of internal and external security into consideration. The statements have been included 
in this document in the form in which they were at the time the statements were made 
(02/2015).
4.1  Summary of the focus areas and development 
recommendations of the sectors concerning the 
interdependence of internal and external security
The increased intertwining of internal and external security and a corresponding change 
in the development of the operations of the authorities responsible for internal and 
external security are highlighted in the statements of the internal affairs administration 
sectors concerning the interdependence of internal and external security. Increased 
immigration, cybercrime, terrorism, violent extremist movements, and organised crime 
are examples of phenomena that connect the internal and external levels of security to 
each other in an increasingly multifaceted manner with increasingly complex causation. 
As a consequence of this trend, the operational environment of the security authorities is 
undergoing a constant change, and it has become increasingly challenging to anticipate 
the direction the development will take. 
26
INRIKESMINISTERIETS PUBLIKATION 37/2016
The changed security environment sets new requirements on the activities of the security 
authorities, with anticipation of the developments in the security environment, and 
the ability to focus the activities rapidly according to developments in the situation, 
particularly emphasised. Security authorities are required to monitor global security 
phenomena and their progression in a more active and systematic manner, and to possess 
the ability to share situational awareness with the different sectors of society. Indeed, the 
sectors of the Ministry of the Interior emphasise the importance of increased dialogue and 
security cooperation with actors creating stability and security in society "from the inside", 
such as the business life and representatives of the third sector. 
As a result of globalisation and the growing mutual correlation of the phenomena, 
security threats have become less dependent on the region or location, and the 
complexity of the development is increased by the actors and the way the combinations 
behind the threats and crimes become more varied and difficult to perceive. Phenomena 
affecting the security of states are thus increasingly often connected to international 
phenomena and trends with complex causations. In the development of cybercrime, 
for example, the cause and targets of the security threat are located in several different 
countries and, correspondingly, means for responding to the security threats that are 
built on national measures, and are thus incompatible with each other, are no longer 
sufficient to respond to this progression. The ability of the security authorities to respond 
to cross-border security challenges and threats requires the capacity for comprehensive 
examination over sectoral borders, and the development of the operational culture 
through measures focusing on rapidity and flexibility. The reinforcement of this 
development requires updating the national and international jurisdictions, juridical basis 
and agreements concerning the information exchange, and information analysis of the 
security authorities, to better match the changed security environment. 
Operating in the changed security environment requires the security actors to make 
a broad examination of the development and to adapt their procedures to match the 
rapidly changing and difficult to anticipate development. In order to anticipate and 
respond to the development, the sectors of the Ministry of the Interior recommend, 
among other things, the promotion of a positive attitude towards reform in the 
operational culture, in order to reinforce the innovation and experimentation culture in 
the internal affairs administration and, correspondingly, to adopt new, flexible practices. 
Tightening the cooperation between national actors is a prerequisite for the development 
of uniform security strategies and situational awareness and analysis. The future need for 
security experts must also be answered through sufficient resourcing in training, research, 
and development by the sectors. The increasing internationalisation of the mechanisms 
affecting the development of the national security environment requires the development 
of the smoothness and effectiveness of processes related to international cooperation. The 
measures for responding to the development are considered to include the improvement 
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of shared registers and other practices related to information acquisition, and increased 
cooperation in areas where security threats form. The development measures will 
reinforce the internal affairs administration's ability to anticipate and respond to the 
increasingly rapid and complex changes in the security environment in the future.
4.2  Police
The interdependence of internal and external security with regard to the police has been 
described by the National Bureau of Investigation, the Police College of Finland, the 
National Police Board, and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.
4.2.1  National Bureau of Investigation
The key challenges of international cooperation and views on the connections between 
internal and external security
Crime and crime prevention have changed significantly during the last ten or so years. 
With this, the interrelation of internal and external security has transformed, and the 
border between them has become unclear. The new rise and internationalisation of 
violent, radical Islamist activity affects the internal and external security of the EU and 
Finland. The strong development and increased utilisation of information networks 
and systems, and the related encryption technology, are typical among government 
intelligence services, criminal and terrorist organisations, radical activist organisations, 
and individual persons of interest.
From the point of view of an individual state, the state's internal and external security 
dimensions can be separated traditionally. The main responsibility for the former is carried 
by the police, and for the latter, by the military authorities. Cybercrime, hybrid threats, 
crime taking place on and utilising the Internet, including dangerous individual persons 
who get examples from abroad and the Internet and who are planning acts of violence, 
cross-border mobile crime, terrorism and its funding, the "Foreign Fighters" phenomenon, 
other crime connected to extremist movements, and organised crime (e.g. so-called 
outlaw motorcycle clubs) are examples of phenomena that do not respect borders but 
make full use of the possibilities offered by free movement and modern technology.
The rapid and obvious blurring of the border between external and internal threats, and 
between international and national threats, has already been reflected in the operations 
of the authorities responsible for security. The law enforcement authorities responsible 
for preventing internal threats are increasingly engaged in international cooperation 
to prevent threats from abroad, and the authorities responsible for traditional external 
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security increasingly utilise information on the state's internal security threats. This article 
examines external and internal security mainly from the perspective of crime prevention.
Effective crime prevention requires predictive, up-to-date and analysed situational and 
crime prevention awareness, rapid response and prevention ability, efficient targeting 
and joint use of resources, and the ability to operate in an international operational and 
cooperation environment. The development has set new requirements for information 
exchange, in particular. In this respect, the keywords are predictability and speed.
Rapidity of change and unpredictability are characteristic of recent developments in the 
operational environment. This places particular demands on the response readiness of 
the organisations and also their ability to switch the focus of their operations according 
to the requirements of the current situation. The police have been able to respond well 
to challenges caused by the immigration situation, for example. New situations have 
required both organisational solutions and particularly well-functioning cooperation, both 
between different police units and in a wider sense.
In today's information-networked world, internal and external security are almost 
perfectly intertwined. One of the challenges in evaluating this new security is, indeed, to 
understand the interconnection of the different levels of security. In the future, cybercrime 
will pose almost as great a threat as traditional crime, which will also be partially carried 
out in the network environment to an increasing degree. Cybercrime and its prevention 
are a great challenge globally. With the increase in its volume, the harm it causes to 
society is also constantly growing. Jurisdictions, regulations on information exchange – 
also between domestic actors – and international conventions do not, however, support 
the prevention of cybercrime very well at all. Crimes carried out and damage coming 
out simultaneously in several countries also place new kinds of challenges on national 
legislation. The perpetrators and victims can be in several different countries, and 
evidence for the crimes must be obtained from servers located around the world.
Various asymmetric threats have risen up alongside traditional threats such as an armed 
attack by a foreign state, and the means of governmental influence (hybrid influence) 
have increased. This, in part, blurs the line between serious disturbances during normal 
conditions and unusual conditions. Identifying the governmental actors and traditional 
international criminal and terrorist organisations behind these threats, and perceiving 
their combinations, has become significantly more difficult than before. The internal 
security authorities must have both the ability to detect the threats and sufficient 
resources to manage the situation, even if it is of a long duration. As the primary 
prevention authorities, the police and the Finnish Border Guard must have sufficient 
situational awareness, the ability and readiness to prevent these kinds of threats before 
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a possible situation that could be considered to be a crisis, and a national increase in 
readiness.
The threat of acts of violence and terrorism by individual, radicalised persons is increasing 
in Finland, too, and an open society is unable to prepare for this to any great degree. 
Following money flow as part of money laundering investigations plays a key role in 
preventing terrorism. The monitoring of social media, in particular, must be able to 
identify, prevent, and react to dangerous individuals planning a crime. Effective Internet 
surveillance supports the prevention of both terrorism and criminal activities by 
dangerous individuals.
It is more essential than before that the operations in the current and foreseeable 
operational environment are commanded effectively. The police force, the general 
authority responsible for crime prevention, is responsible for this duty. The other 
authorities participating in crime prevention are also involved in operations in their own 
fields of speciality.
In addition to crime prevention, the police force plays an important role in the 
investigation of accidents and major accidents, and the identification of victims, which 
forms an essential part of this. Globally growing tourism and the resulting increase in 
the number of accidents involving persons from several different countries have placed 
entirely new kinds of requirements on police activities. Like crime prevention, these 
activities also often require operating in another country or several countries, rapid 
response ability, and functional international information exchange.
Concrete proposals for action and development
The judicial basis, and both national and international instruments for proactive crime 
prevention by administrative means, are lacking, and concrete models must be found for 
such proactive measures. The obstacles preventing the use of administrative information 
in crime prevention and crime prevention information in administrative matters must be 
removed. The strategy for the prevention of organised crime should be continued. With 
regard to financial crime prevention programmes, for instance, it has been evident that 
their consistent and long-term continuation, in particular, has made crime prevention 
work more effective and taken it in an increasingly concrete direction.
The situational and crime prevention awareness function led by the police should 
be further developed and reinforced in such a way that the function can be used to 
prevent crimes effectively and in real time, and coordinate the entirety of national 
and international crime prevention utilising the necessary systems and registers in 
full. Furthermore, the flow of information must be developed, and obstacles removed 
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from closer cooperation between the different authorities. Information exchange with, 
for example, the municipal sector, the business sector, and the third sector should be 
increased and supported through legislation.
The development of intelligence registers should take uniformity, usability, cooperation 
among multiple authorities, and the international dimension into consideration. In 
order to steer crime prevention, there should be a permanent intelligence register and a 
functional analysis register built into it. The situation is peculiar when national information 
can be analysed better and more extensively at Europol, for example, than in the 
homeland.
Privacy protection requirements at national and international levels have become stricter, 
while the regulation of crime prevention in general has significantly increased. In this 
situation, the needs of effective and more rapid operations should be ensured, however. It 
should be possible to dismantle the overemphasis on privacy protection and thus increase 
information exchange between authorities in order to enhance crime prevention. This 
becomes an issue in, for example, the prevention of serious acts of violence. 
Special attention should be given to attaining closer international cooperation and, in 
particular, the real-time nature of crime prevention, by bringing up nationally important 
issues in different forums on the procedural, system, legislation, and agreement levels. 
In order to further speed up international information exchange, automated models and 
methods should be developed and utilised.
Particularly in the prevention of cybercrime, but also in other international crime 
prevention, means of information acquisition should be made easier and quicker by 
establishing a legal foundation and practical channels that take the requirements set by 
the new operational environment into account. In particular, the availability of information 
from foreign service providers (e.g. Google, Facebook, Twitter) should be improved and 
made quicker.
The focus of crime prevention related to terrorism, extremist movements (including the 
"Foreign Fighter" phenomenon), and marginalisation should be moved towards proactive 
prevention.
The requirement for speed and prevention, and the multifaceted nature of the operations, 
mean that the police should be supported more clearly in their duties of leading and 
coordinating crime prevention.
In the future, the police should also have, among other things, a more extensive 
opportunity for task prioritisation and, instead of the so-called mandatory pre-trial 
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investigation, should have the power to decide what criminal cases to take under 
investigation at their discretion, which would mean the right of investigation instead of 
an investigation obligation. This applies to both mass crime and, for example, cybercrime, 
because not all companies necessarily report crimes to the police due to the publicity 
resulting from the investigation, for example. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to form 
the situational awareness important to crime prevention.
In the development of cooperation between authorities related to internal and external 
security, it is particularly important to take into consideration the other authorities 
resorting to the police network, operating nationwide on a 24/7 principle.
4.2.2  Police College of Finland
Because taking care of the strategic core duties of internal security, providing key services 
to the citizens, and ensuring the security of the state in the future requires a wide-ranging 
internal security strategy, it is necessary to examine the activities of the Police College of 
Finland from the perspectives of its duties and its action-strategy impact, both nationally 
and internationally. It is evident that, in accordance with the assumption of the working 
group, international activities must be considered to be vital for the internal security of 
Finland and the entire EU.
It is the duty of the Police College of Finland to provide higher education in the internal 
security sector, with research and culture as the baseline for vocational expert and 
leadership duties, and to support the professional growth of the actors and promote their 
lifelong learning. Additionally, its duties include applied research and development work 
in the service of the planning and development of policing and internal security, and of 
the teaching at the Police College of Finland. When performing its duties, the College 
cooperates with the national and international stakeholders of the police. The successful 
performance of the duties assigned to the College requires that it strives to influence the 
phenomena and trends in its broad security environment – particularly in the medium 
and long term – and to support the cross-border and international law enforcement and 
security authority activities aiming to manage them.
The focus areas defined for the internal affairs administration in the EU and for 
international affairs include promoting Finland's operational objectives in the European 
Union, taking note of the development of the international security situation, preparing 
for changes in the external security environment, managing migration and control of the 
external borders, and improving the prerequisites for effective international cooperation. 
In accordance with the international focus areas of the Ministry of the Interior, the 
activities of the Police College of Finland emphasise regional cooperation, cooperation 
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between the EU member states and agencies, cooperation with third countries, and the 
development of activities. 
In accordance with the Ministry of the Interior's group strategy, the Police College of 
Finland also supports Finland's active presence in crisis areas by bolstering the export 
of security competence and effectively developing the national readiness of the law 
enforcement authorities and actors for cross-border issues. In accordance with the 
international strategy of the police, cooperation is emphasised particularly with globally 
important countries; when it comes to other, third countries, the development of 
cooperation is focused on countries with which there is assessed to be a special strategic 
or operational need to cooperate.
The most important means for achieving the above-mentioned objectives are the 
production of high-level, future-oriented, broad, and adaptive competence particularly 
for the use of internal security authorities (including sufficient competence in using the 
instruments, channels, and cooperation methods of the EU and other police cooperation); 
participation in development work and networks for European and regional cooperation 
between law enforcement authorities, thus making it possible to obtain international 
study and work experience; and support for the export of competence and reforms of 
third-country law enforcement authorities. The research and development activities will 
involve close cooperation with police and security sector networks and consortiums. The 
selection of topics is wide, covering projects related to security sector training and job 
contents, police activities, cooperation between the authorities, and the change in the 
operational environment. Individual projects have touched upon many key themes in 
internal security, such as immigration, organised crime, money laundering, corruption, 
terrorism, and firearms-related information exchange.
It must be stated as a megatrend-level observation, due to both the above and, for 
example, the EU's internal and external security convergence, that the internal and 
external security dimensions and phenomena are irrevocably intertwined. Thus, a clear 
and somewhat increasing part of the security production system of states belongs – 
subject-matter-wise – to the external dimension of internal security. However, functions 
still remain, in both internal and external security, in which the above-mentioned 
interconnection hardly exists.
The challenges of the Police College of Finland's duties with regard to international 
influence and cooperation are realised, on one hand, in the administrative branch's cross-
pressured steering policies, which are derived from strategic focus areas but which are 
partially short-sighted, and, on the other hand, in the administrative branch's structures 
and processes, which are still based on the "order-based" success model. In other words, 
steerability based on strategic and result-oriented bases is limited by the differences 
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between the administrative branch's intent and beliefs, and its structures and operations. 
Challenges related to these arise particularly from the underdeveloped nature and the 
timidity for reforms of the administration's innovation environment and the so-called 
"experimental culture". On the contrary, the development of effectual international 
cooperation requires the adoption of a "synergy-oriented" success model.
When broken down into subject areas, at least the following can be seen as the key 
challenges of international cooperation: 
1. Resourcing and funding of competence exports (support for police reforms); re-
search, development, and innovation projects; and influencing the security environ-
ment (internal and external security perspectives) through RD&I activities and the 
development of competence
Several potential possibilities for exporting Finnish law enforcement, policing, and 
education competence have been identified in the sector of international capacity 
development. Direct interest and offers have been received from prospective recipient 
states, the foreign affairs administration, and the internal affairs group administration. 
In practice, the possibilities of exporting competence are diverse with regard to both 
funding and forms of cooperation. The police department of the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Police College of Finland have jointly developed a model for taking goal-oriented 
activities, promotion of national interests, the efficient use of resources, and the potential 
possibilities into consideration as a whole. The model has been utilised since 2013, but the 
resourcing dialogue and decision-making related to the matter have not yet been carried 
out.
Internal and external security have converged, so this connection should be taken into 
consideration when attempting to influence the working programmes of the EU funding 
sources and the national resourcing of RD&I projects related to the subject matter. On the 
other hand, deliberation on the subject matter and the resourcing of the projects should 
ensure that funding is also directed in a balanced manner to the examination of those 
functions and phenomena that are mainly part of either internal or external security. In 
internal security, possible topics could include security in scarcely populated areas, local 
security cooperation, or everyday crime.
2. Partial discreteness of development policy and internal security
Development policy targeted at third countries, particularly the EU neighbourhood 
policy and other countries from which crime originates, must be connected within wider 
development activities of Finland's internal security, where both medium and long-term 
objectives are clearly taken into consideration. The law enforcement authorities must 
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be able to work and develop the necessary security structures and solutions jointly with 
the authorities of the target countries. The security cooperation must aim at both the 
development of the target countries' own capacity and mutual trust and crime prevention 
cooperation. 
3. Development of national preparedness for crisis management and influence in the 
decision-making of the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP) sector
The police and, in particular, the Police College of Finland have a clear needs-based role in 
the development of national preparedness for civilian crisis management in cooperation 
with the Crisis Management Centre. Almost half of Finland's civilian crisis management 
experts are police officers. However, the administrative position of the Crisis Management 
Centre is not appropriate with regard to the objectives of its activities. In addition to this, 
the further development of cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior in identifying the 
policing competence needs of civilian crisis management missions would further improve 
the correspondence between demand and supply, although significant steps have already 
been taken in this direction.
According to the Police College of Finland's vision, the college is a top-level police school 
and a valued member of the European higher education community. The competencies 
of the college are used in a variety of ways to maintain the security of society. Achieving 
this objective also requires a more open and stronger utilisation of the police and law 
enforcement sector in the handling of and preparation for external threats to internal 
security and the related countermeasures.
4.2.3  National Police Board
Demarcation of internal and external security
In accordance with the Security Strategy for Society, functions vital to Finnish society are 
the management of Government affairs, international activity, Finland's defence capability, 
functioning of the economy and infrastructure, the population's income security and 
capability to function, psychological resistance to crisis, and internal security. From 
the point of view of the state, the state's internal and external security dimensions are 
traditionally separated. Primarily, law enforcement authorities such as the police take care 
of internal security, and external security is dealt with the military authorities.
According to the Internal Security Programme, internal security is a state of society in 
which everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the judicial system 
and a safe society without fear or insecurity caused by crime, disturbances, accidents, or 
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phenomena or changes in Finnish society or the increasingly international world. In turn, 
the external security of the state can be endangered by all endeavours that have a harmful 
impact on the rights or interests of the state, or the relations between Finland and foreign 
powers.
The concepts of internal and external security can change unpredictably, and an 
unwavering line cannot be drawn between them. It is a question of perspective: the 
concept of internal security is strongly built on the viewpoint of individual people, while 
the concept of external security emphasises a governmental perspective that is, first 
and foremost, related to the autonomy of the state. The law enforcement authorities 
responsible for preventing internal threats are increasingly engaged in international 
cooperation to prevent threats from abroad, and the authorities responsible for traditional 
external security increasingly utilise information on the state's internal security threats.
From the perspective of the police, drawing a line between internal and external 
security is more difficult than before, due to the constant change in crime and the 
entire operational environment: criminal phenomena, such as terrorism and violent 
radicalisation, information network crime, the infiltration of organised crime into business 
life and the structures of society, and illegal immigration, create challenges to maintaining 
internal security. With regard to external security interfaces in particular, the social and 
economic impacts caused by various crises (Ukraine, Georgia, the Arab Spring, Syria, 
and natural catastrophes) further escalate the crises without regard to national borders. 
Geopolitical instability increases and conflicts spread and last for years, affecting the 
internal security of the EU member states.
The activities of the authorities are steered by the European Union, the several strategies 
it produces at various levels, and the emphasis on the development of criminal justice: 
EU regulations are not always a good fit for the Finnish judicial system. As a result of the 
challenges facing public finances and the deficient central government finances, the 
expectations linked to criminalisation and strategies do not match the frameworks of 
the authorities and their practical operating conditions. It is sometimes challenging to 
combine basic and human rights with the regulatory framework governing the activities 
of the authorities.
In the (internal) security sector, the police force follows the focus areas of the EU Policy 
Cycle. In the autumn of 2014, the National Police Board confirmed that its focus areas 
with regard to the future internal security strategy are: 1) measures against organised 
crime, 2) prevention of cybercrime, 3) counterterrorism, and 4) prevention of illegal 
immigration. The means mentioned in this context include better information exchange 
and cooperation with third countries.
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Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism is a large part of the competence of the member states, which 
means that the exchange of intelligence, for example, largely takes place between the 
intelligence and security services, for which cooperation with the law enforcement 
authorities must be improved. Information exchange and management play an essential 
role. The challenge will be to utilise the European Police Office (Europol) and Interpol 
effectively in the exchange and analysis of (crime) intelligence, if the member states 
exchange information through other bilateral and multilateral channels. The possibilities 
of Eurojust must also be utilised better (for example, using common investigation teams).
Many threats of terrorism are directed at the member states from outside the EU, which 
emphasises the importance of cooperation with third countries (e.g. Turkey and the 
western Balkans), and border security. In the countries where terrorism originates, it 
must be possible to influence the conditions and to support developments decreasing 
recruitment into the ranks of the terrorists. When it comes to the EU's external borders in 
particular, risk-based operations must be developed in order to allow sufficient control of 
border traffic without compromising the smoothness of travel (Entry/Exit, Smart Borders, 
PNR). Although we prepare for the consequences of terrorism, the focus of international 
cooperation must be on the prevention of violent radicalisation and having an impact 
on the causes of terrorism. Therefore, all member states must utilise the experience and 
education offering of, for example, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in order 
to identify the phenomenon widely and to be able to influence it. The prevention must 
emphasise cooperation between the authorities and the third sector, and must find the 
models best suited to the conditions in Finland.
In 2014, the EU prepared an updated strategy for preventing radicalisation and 
recruitment, and guidelines related to the strategy. Their implementation must be 
immediately begun at EU level and in the member states, and the progress of the 
measures must be monitored. Communications at a strategic level should be similar in the 
different member states in order to achieve better results.
An attempt must be made to weed out the funding of terrorism, and this requires broad 
international cooperation. The Internet plays a key role in terrorist recruitment and 
radicalisation. Internet service providers and individual persons play an important role 
in intervening in terrorist materials. The EU-level cooperation already initiated with, for 
example, the larger service operators (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, etc.) must be continued, 
and the best practices must be shared among the member states. 
Regardless of the growth of the Foreign Fighter phenomenon and the Paris attacks, there 
is no need at the EU level for new instruments (except the so-called EU-PNR Directive, 
which should be finished post-haste); instead, the focus should be on the full utilisation 
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of the current means (e.g. SIS II, FP Travellers). In international cooperation, even more 
attention must be paid to amalgamating the internal and external security measures, and 
cooperation between institutions operating in these sectors must be increased.
Organised crime, cyber issues, and, in particular, the development/problems of cross-
border information acquisition
Crime and crime prevention have changed significantly during the last ten or so years. 
With it, the interrelation of internal and external security has transformed, and the border 
between them has become unclear. The new rise and internationalisation of violent radical 
Islamist activity will affect the internal and external security of the EU and Finland. The 
strong development and increased utilisation of information networks and systems, and 
the related encryption technology, are typical among government intelligence services, 
criminal and terrorist organisations, radical activist organisations, and individual persons 
of interest.
Cybercrime, crime taking place on and utilising the Internet, cross-border mobile crime, 
terrorism and its funding, the "Foreign Fighters" phenomenon, other crime connected to 
extremist movements, and organised crime (e.g. so-called outlaw motorcycle clubs) are 
examples of phenomena that do not respect borders but make full use of the possibilities 
offered by free movement and modern technology instead.
Today, internal and external security are thus almost completely intertwined in the world 
of information networks. One of the challenges in evaluating this new security is, indeed, 
to understand the interconnection of the different levels of security. Various asymmetric 
threats have arisen alongside traditional threats, which, in part, blurs the line between 
serious disturbances during normal conditions and unusual conditions. Identifying the 
governmental actors and traditional international criminal and terrorist organisations 
behind these threats, and perceiving their combinations, has become significantly more 
difficult than before. The rapid and obvious blurring of the border between external and 
internal threats, as well as international and national threats, has already been reflected in 
the operations of the authorities responsible for security. The law enforcement authorities 
responsible for preventing internal threats are increasingly engaged in international 
cooperation to prevent threats from abroad, and the authorities responsible for traditional 
external security increasingly utilise information on the state's internal security threats. 
However, this memo has examined external and internal security mainly from the 
perspective of crime prevention.
Effective crime prevention requires predictive, up-to-date, and analysed situational and 
crime prevention awareness, rapid response and prevention ability, efficient targeting 
and joint use of resources, and the ability to operate in an international operational 
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and cooperation environment. This development has placed entirely new requirements 
on information exchange in particular, with predictability and speed as the keywords. 
Effective leadership of operations is even more essential than before in this kind of 
operational environment. The police force, which is the general authority responsible for 
crime prevention, is responsible for this duty. The other key authorities participating in 
crime prevention are also involved in the operations in their own fields of speciality.
It has become a problem that the national development of legislation lags behind the 
quickly changing operational environment, in which crimes and damage can take place at 
a rapid pace in several different countries, the perpetrators and victims can be in several 
different countries, and evidence for the crimes must be obtained from servers located 
around the world.
In addition to crime prevention, the police force plays an important role in the 
investigation of accidents and major accidents, and the identification of victims forms an 
essential part of this. Globally growing tourism and the resulting increase in the number 
of accidents that may involve persons from several different countries have placed entirely 
new kinds of requirements on police activities. Like crime prevention, these activities also 
often require operating in another country or several countries, rapid response ability, and 
functional international information exchange.
Cooperation between the police and judicial authorities
In Finland, the division between judicial and law enforcement authorities has not 
traditionally been considered to be as steep as elsewhere in Europe. In Finland, recent 
developments in the implementation of the instruments of international cooperation 
have had the effect of international cooperation in crime prevention becoming more 
prosecutor-driven. The cooperation between the police and the judicial authorities in 
Finland has traditionally been close and functional, so that the decision-making related 
to operations has been the responsibility of the police, with the exception of certain 
coercive measures. Internationally, the police force, in the role of a judicial authority, 
with the right to issue requests for information and depositions covered by strict legality 
and quality control, has been our strength. It is not reasonable to take examples in this 
work from countries where the corresponding cooperation does not exist, or where 
barriers have been built between the judicial and police authorities. According to the 
observations, the artificial insertion of the European model into our system has increased 
formality and rigidity in the handling of matters. Should this prosecutor-oriented model 
be implemented, it would result in decreased prerequisites for information exchange and 
would slow down information exchange. Changes in this direction should be resisted.
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Information exchange and information availability principle
In the prevention and discovery of crimes, and in their investigation, it is absolutely critical 
to supply real-time crime intelligence from one law enforcement authority to another. The 
prerequisites for information availability should be improved, and the reliability and speed 
of information exchange increased where possible. The means for this are the utilisation of 
the principles recorded in the multi-year programmes and, at the EU level, also the better 
utilisation of EU agencies. Nationally, the dismantling of obstacles hindering information 
exchange can continue.
Identifying the backgrounds and connections of the perpetrators immediately at the 
beginning would be of key importance, and for this, crime intelligence accumulated in 
each member state is needed. Significant progress has been made in this regard at EU 
level over recent years, through the reinforcement of Europol's role and the expansion of 
the use of the SIENA channel; however, the full utilisation of these possibilities continues 
to remain a key challenge at EU level. Finland has been actively involved in the so-called 
ADEP project, the objective of which is to promote automation that, in part, advances the 
information availability principle (the EPRIS project was rejected by the Commission after 
a feasibility assessment).
The availability principle is served by, for example, the Swedish Initiative, Prüm 
cooperation, and the possibilities offered by Europol. It also remains to be seen how the 
future Eurojust cooperation develops, what the decision on the European prosecutor will 
be, and what its significance will be. Both offer tools, if they are implemented sensibly 
at EU level and nationally, however. The speed of information exchange is central to the 
improvement of the prerequisites for information exchange. When the parties can reliably 
identify each other, and the standards for information processing work, the protection of 
basic rights can also be guaranteed and the use and disclosure of information monitored. 
The expansion of the use of Europol's SIENA system will speed up information exchange 
and improve the availability of information. Processing rules for Europol information can 
be used to limit both the information's purpose of use and its disclosure. The rest of the 
world can be reached through Europol. The Schengen Information System can be used 
to quickly and reliably get large masses of information for use by the authorities. These 
separate international information systems cover different types of information, subject-
wise, and geographically different areas, but they complement each other.
The principle of information availability and the dismantling of obstacles hindering 
information exchange between the authorities should be continued. Future challenges 
are the utilisation of PNR information, the significance of the Eurodac system, and the 
information of the VIS system. When the information exchange is implemented with clear 
rules and through sufficiently centralised structures, the parties will not have trouble 
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identifying each other, and there will be no doubts concerning the information's right 
purpose of use.
Crime prevention cooperation and enhancement of information exchange with third 
Countries
In police cooperation with third countries, lower-level cooperation relationships 
at agency and ministry level have been actively concluded recently, and initiatives 
have been received from numerous countries and agencies. The latest examples of 
cooperation relationships are Serbia and Nigeria and, of initiatives, Georgia and Belarus. 
Significantly more determined and goal-oriented operations are required in concluding 
these cooperation relationships. It would also be essential to identify key actors in third 
countries, and to conclude bilateral cooperation relationships starting from the national 
operational needs of crime prevention.
Concrete proposals for action and development for the police
The police force considers the following practical measures to be the best practices for the 
improvement of internal and external security from the perspective of the police:
Particularly in the prevention of cybercrime, but also in other international crime 
prevention, means of information acquisition should be made easier and quicker by 
establishing a legal foundation and practical channels that take the requirements set by 
the new operational environment into account. The availability of information needed 
from service providers should be further improved and expedited, bypassing the slow and 
rigid judicial assistance procedure. Particular attention must then be paid to safeguarding 
basic rights, however.
The judicial basis and both national and international instruments for proactive crime 
prevention by administrative means are lacking, and particular attention must be paid to 
them.
In order to further speed up international information exchange, automated models and 
methods should be developed and utilised.
Privacy protection requirements at national and international levels have become stricter. 
In this situation, the need for effective and more rapid operations should be met, however.
The situational and crime prevention awareness function led by the police should 
be further developed and reinforced in such a way that the function can be used to 
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prevent crimes effectively and in real time, and to coordinate the entirety of national and 
international crime prevention utilising the necessary systems and registers in full. 
The development of intelligence registers should take uniformity, usability, cooperation 
between multiple authorities, and the international dimension into consideration.
Special attention should be given to attaining closer international cooperation and, in 
particular, to the real-time nature of crime prevention, by bringing up nationally important 
issues in different forums on the procedural, system, legislation, and agreement levels.
The focus of crime prevention related to terrorism and extremist movements (including 
the "Foreign Fighter" phenomenon) should be moved towards proactive prevention.
Due to the rapidity requirement, prevention, and the diverse nature of operations, clearer 
support should be given to the management and coordination of crime prevention, which 
are the duties of the police.
Active participation is required in international security work and police affairs in the 
EU and other international forums. The purpose is to have a proactive influence on both 
the legislation and the activities, and to proactively adopt the best practices nationally, 
sufficiently connecting them to international activities. With regard to civilian crisis 
management, police participation in international civilian crisis management is ensured. 
The development of third countries' own security capabilities will increase the safety 
of Europe and its neighbouring areas. Offering internal security resources for use by EU 
operations outside the borders of the EU will also create stability in the EU area.
Information exchange will be improved between third countries, in the EU, and at 
national level. At EU and national levels, it must be ensured that sufficient authorisations 
and information systems exist for the purposes of information exchange, for example, 
and that the information of all EU agencies is available to law enforcement. Analysis is 
always connected to information exchange. In connection to information exchange, 
the implementation of the PNR Directive is ensured with regard to the police, and the 
construction of the PIU centre led by the National Police Board is realised (the PNR 
project). International judicial assistance poses a special challenge.
With regard to police affairs, a commitment is made to the strategies and action plans 
of the EU's Home Affairs police and criminal justice sector, and to implementing them 
nationally in a purposeful and effective way. Ensure that the national steering documents 
for the police sector (terrorism, cyber, organised crime, illegal immigration) are always 
synchronised at EU level as a rule.
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Operational cooperation with third countries: for the police, create possible permanent 
operational structures that are currently missing. Utilise the PTR concept in such a manner 
that, in the future, EU strategies are also synchronised with the PTR function. (Close 
connection between border control and police work, the Baltic countries, Russia, Finland/
Estonia as a particular focus versus the African immigrants in Southern Europe.)
Nationally: synergies in the duties and authorisations of the security authorities: the 
relationships between the duties and authorisations of the security authorities should be 
analysed in a controlled manner. There is currently some overlap, and not all actors among 
the authorities possess a precise awareness of them. Preparing for hybrid threats also 
requires this demarcation. Be an active influence in the overall security field as well.
Economy: are synergies, for example, used efficiently, avoiding unnecessary and 
redundant work? The relationship between the duties and funding of the security 
authorities must be carefully reviewed between the authorities and internally to the 
authorities (the police). Examples of concrete measures are the visibility of this in the 
police strategy (vision of the leadership), centralisation of premises and support functions, 
and, with regard to the police, the long-term budget planning currently included in 
the strategy, taking into consideration the use of resources, staggered equipment 
procurement, and so on.
The organised crime strategy will be updated. An attempt will be made to increase the 
availability of administrative information to the police. Focus on decreasing the financial 
prerequisites for organised crime and confiscating the proceeds of crime.
Prepare the cyber action policies for the police (in sync with the EU level): the police 
should perceive the cyber environment as an opportunity and resource, through which 
online services are offered to the police's customers, and through which the police's 
internal systems and tools work and the information acquisition authorisations and 
cyberdefence tasks are done. For its part, the police force commits to developing research 
and training in this field.
Update the counterterrorism policies of the police (in sync with the EU level). Further 
develop concrete means for preventing violent radicalisation, such as the threat 
assessment tool of the police developed in 2013-2014.
Ensure that police units are aware of the up-to-date issues in fighting illegal immigration. 
Participate actively in the return of illegal residents to their country of origin.
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4.2.4  Finnish Security Intelligence Service
Key proposals
Safeguarding the order of Finland as a state and as a society, and identifying and 
preventing any external and internal threats endangering them, is the purpose of 
the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. One of its key duties is to produce strategic 
information on the operational environment for the use of security policymakers.
The purpose of the information acquisition priorities of the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service is to steer information acquisition serving national security, connected to 
the prevention of projects targeting Finland's sovereignty as a state and of crimes. A 
mechanism has been created for the annual definition of the information acquisition 
priorities, allowing the confirmation of the external and internal threats or phenomena 
that can be deemed to decrease national security. An endeavour to improve the 
acquisition of up-to-date information related to Finland's foreign affairs and security 
policymaking lies behind the mechanism. The information acquisition priorities are 
defined under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, which directs the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service.
Taking the tighter-than-before intertwining of phenomena related to internal and external 
security into consideration, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service should have the 
possibility to acquire intelligence supporting the decision-making of the country's top 
leadership and concerning external security threats abroad as well. It would be a matter 
of acquiring, from persons and information systems, information necessary to prevent 
projects that endanger national security. 
The administrative status of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service changed at the 
beginning of 2016, when the agency was moved directly under the Ministry of the Interior. 
Regardless of the change in the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's administrative 
status, it will be ensured that, in the future, cooperation between the Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service, the police, and other authorities in national security matters, and the 
related information exchange, remains at a good level and continues to be developed.
The development of competencies related to security intelligence activities connected 
to the interface of external and internal security should be taken into consideration more 
intensively in cooperation with both domestic and foreign authorities. In particular, this 
should include cooperation in training related to information acquisition and analysis.
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The views of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service on the connections between 
internal and external security
On concepts
In the police organisation, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, operating as a national 
unit, is responsible for preventing threats to national security. According to Section 
10 of the Act on Police Administration (110/1992), it is the duty of the Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service to combat projects and crimes that could endanger the order of 
Finland as a state and as a society, or the internal or external security of the state, and to 
investigate such crimes. It must also maintain and develop the overall preparedness for 
preventing activities endangering national security. 
The Internal Security Programme defines internal security as a state of society in which 
everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the judicial system, and a safe 
society without fear or insecurity caused by crime, disturbances, accidents, or phenomena 
or changes in the Finnish society or the increasingly international world. According to the 
final report of the parliamentary police committee (1986), the external security of the state 
may be endangered by all endeavours with a harmful impact on the rights or interests of 
the state, or on relations between Finland and foreign powers.
The concepts of internal and external security can change unpredictably, and an 
unwavering line cannot be drawn between them. It is a question of perspective: the 
concept of internal security is strongly built on the viewpoint of individual people, while 
the concept of external security emphasises a governmental perspective that is, first and 
foremost, related to the autonomy of the state.
Internal and external security in the operations of the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service
The operations of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service take place at the juncture 
of internal and external security. The common feature of the crimes and projects 
prevented by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is that they are targeted at 
Finland's sovereignty as a state. This is obvious in the case of crimes against the state and 
treason, but the same idea is also present in the criminalisation of terrorism. According 
to the Criminal Code, the perpetrator has a terrorist intent if their purpose is to force 
the government of a state to do, tolerate, or not do something, or if they endeavour 
to wrongfully overthrow the constitution of a state. Of the crimes with international 
connections that the Finnish Security Intelligence Service should prevent, particularly acts 
related to terrorism and illegal activism usually involve concrete acts against citizens, and 
thus have an impact in the core area of internal security. 
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With internationalisation, the line between external and internal security has become 
increasingly blurred. Defining threats and risks depending on region or locale is 
increasingly difficult due to the cross-border nature and interdependence of economic, 
technical, and social systems. Today, the factors posing the most serious threat to the 
security of Finland are often connected to events outside Finland. Thus, the consequences 
of a threat that is of foreign origin and that comes into existence abroad may be realised 
in Finland more easily than before. A common characteristic of external threats to national 
security is that it is increasingly difficult to identify and tell apart the governmental and 
non-governmental actors behind them. For this reason, it is nowadays more challenging 
to anticipate the threats.
The threats can be roughly divided into those of a civilian and military nature. Key 
security threats of a civilian nature can be considered to include at least international 
terrorism, covert intelligence operations by foreign powers targeting Finland and its 
interests, attempts to distribute weapons of mass destruction and dual-use products, 
and international organised crime of the type that attempts to influence public decision-
making or infiltrate state structures. In recent years, cross-border spying taking place in 
information networks, in particular, has become a serious threat. Such activities enable 
the centralised acquisition of large amounts of information, which may cause irreparable 
damage to the security and interests of the target state. Sabotage and falsification of data 
in information networks are also significant threats.
With regard to counterterrorism, the increase in the number of persons of interest, which 
is estimated to continue, is a key driver of change. While the number of persons of interest 
has increased, several factors that have previously protected Finland from terrorism – 
including its impartial and less visible role in international politics, social cohesion, and 
the lack of significant immigrant communities from conflict areas – are disappearing. 
Connections between Finland and terrorist operators abroad have increased. Foreign 
networks of radicals have started to create connections to and recruit followers from 
Islamist networks established in Finland. The changes in the operational environment of 
counterterrorism are discussed more extensively in the national counterterrorism strategy.
The activity of intelligence operations by foreign intelligence services in Finland have 
returned to a so-called Cold War level. Technical intelligence operations in information 
network environments have risen alongside and in support of intelligence operations 
based on personal sources; detecting and preventing them is difficult.
Illegal activism has increasingly moved into information networks. The use of anonymous 
services as forums for threats, hate speech, and extreme opinions has become more 
prevalent. Threats are made increasingly and more easily against both members of the 
government and other public persons.
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As a consequence of the general globalisation trend, the security issues of individual 
states have become international in nature. In practice, the phenomena threatening the 
security of Finland and their background factors are, without exception, connected to 
events and trends outside our country, which are difficult to perceive to a certain degree. 
Due to the cross-border nature of the security issues, the need for analysed international 
security intelligence has grown significantly. Effective security intelligence related to 
global threats requires more diverse means and approaches. This poses new kinds of 
challenges to the information acquisition and analysis activities of the Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service.
The key challenges of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's international 
cooperation
Acquisition of intelligence from abroad
The operational environment of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is decidedly 
international. In order for the Finnish Security Intelligence Service to be able to perform 
its mandated duties, it must acquire a sufficient amount of foreign intelligence pertinent 
to Finland's security situation. The acquisition of information is based on the international 
bilateral and multilateral confidential information exchange among security and 
intelligence services. Cooperation with the national authorities of different countries 
is complemented by the information exchange with the European Union Intelligence 
Analysis Centre. 
International cooperation procedures in the service of crime prevention must be kept 
separate from international intelligence cooperation. Their significance in the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service's purview is minor. One key reason for this is that the target 
persons of crime prevention carried out by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service usually 
act on behalf of a foreign state, often as its officials, against the interests of Finland. The 
state benefiting from the crime will not, in practice, assist the state – such as Finland – that 
is the target of the crime in preventing, uncovering, or investigating said crime. 
No legislation exists on the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's information acquisition 
abroad. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service's information acquisition is based on 
the use of authority related to the prevention and uncovering of crime in accordance 
with the Police Act. It can use this authority only within Finnish borders. In practice, the 
Finnish Security Intelligence Service's information acquisition from abroad is based on 
its international intelligence cooperation, monitoring of open sources, and the Finnish 
Security Intelligence Service's own liaison activities.
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Security and intelligence service cooperation
Since Finland became independent, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and its 
predecessors have been in extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign 
intelligence and security services. This cooperation helps ensure the acquisition of foreign 
intelligence necessary for maintaining the security of the state, for use by Finland's 
competent authorities. Due to the general globalisation development of security issues 
and the resulting emphasis on foreign intelligence, the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service has in recent years systematically expanded its international cooperation network 
so that today, it can be considered to cover the intelligence and security bodies of 
countries essential to Finland's security.
The security and intelligence services cooperate both bilaterally and through various 
multilateral forums. What is significant for Finland and the Finnish Security Intelligence 
Service in this cooperation is that, as a rule, security and intelligence services cooperate 
only with their foreign counterparts instead of with the police and other law enforcement 
authorities. 
The bilateral cooperation between security and intelligence services often takes place 
on a case-by-case basis, and is based on meeting the operational interests of the parties 
involved. The cooperation usually concerns a concrete threat that could impact both 
states if it materialised. The forms of cooperation include information exchange between 
the parties and coordinated intelligence acquisition operations. The Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service has a cooperation relationship with around 80 foreign security police, 
security service, and intelligence service authorities.
The importance of multilateral security and intelligence service forums as information 
exchange channels has increased with the internationalisation of the threats and 
phenomena being prevented. For the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the form 
of international cooperation with the longest history is the network of Nordic partner 
agencies, under which the agency heads and the managers of the different operational 
sectors meet regularly. In addition, expert meetings are arranged for the purpose of 
sharing and analysing information concerning all Nordic countries. The Nordic countries 
also have established cooperation in preparing strategic assessments of phenomena and 
threats.
The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has been a member of the so-called Bern Club, 
primarily consisting of security services, since the 1990s. This cooperation developed into 
the security services' cooperation forum Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), concentrating on 
counterterrorism, of which the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is also a member.
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The EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) is an organisation compiling information 
from the civilian intelligence services and civilian security services of the member states. 
Its duties include supporting the EU's policymakers with expert and timely information. 
EU INTCEN itself does not gather intelligence, and it does not have the authority to, 
for example, use coercive measures; instead, the intelligence analyses and situational 
awareness it produces are based on the intelligence supplied by the civilian intelligence 
services and civilian security services of the member states. The division of competence 
defined in the Lisbon convention is in the background, according to which national 
security issues are within the competence of the member states. The Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service works in cooperation with EU INTCEN.
In recent years, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service has had short and long-term 
liaisons stationed in Finnish embassies in certain countries outside Europe, where they 
have diplomatic status with the resulting rights and immunities. The liaisons of the 
Finnish Security Intelligence Service participate in the prevention of external threats 
to the security of the state, for example, by maintaining contacts with the authorities 
of the country in which they are stationed, as well as with the authorities of other 
countries represented there. The activities of the liaisons are based on the application 
of the provisions of the Act on the Processing of Personal Data by the Police, concerning 
international information exchange by the police.
4.3  Finnish Border Guard
The key challenges of the international activities in the border security sector
Border security covers border control, the monitoring and safeguarding of territorial 
integrity, and the maintenance of readiness for national defence.
The key challenges of the international activities in the border security sector can be 
divided into three categories, which are: 1) challenges related to the change in the 
operational environment, including diverse threats; 2) challenges with institutions; and 3) 
challenges with several actors.
Change in the operational environment
The change in the external and internal operational environment has a direct impact on 
international cooperation and its focus. It also has a direct impact on the implementation 
of border security and the available resources. International cooperation and the 
believable maintenance of national border security go hand in hand. Today, the 
operational environment is changing rapidly, and the changes have become more 
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unpredictable. For this reason, obtaining and allocating necessary new resources often 
involves a delay. Indeed, the importance of international cooperation has increased due to 
global threats and crises.
The threats related to border security have become more diverse. From the perspective of 
border security, hybrid threats comprise a wide spectrum of threats, starting from illegal 
immigration in peace time, cross-border crime, foreign fighters and terrorism, and ending 
in political-military pressure and, even further, the use of military force. Governmental 
actors are often behind the hybrid threats. The changed threats require new procedures 
and practices, and cooperation with several actors. In peace time, the importance of 
cooperation with internal security actors is emphasised in the maintenance of border 
security. In an escalated political-military pressure situation, close cooperation with the 
defence administration is essential. 
Preparation for the prevention of threats requires ensuring that the border security 
systems work and are available (e.g. registers), and also requires readiness to, for instance, 
protect certain sites.
Recent events show that, in some situations, there is a need to influence external security 
using internal security means and vice versa. In both cases, reinforcing border security 
is an important element in the selection of measures, including the use of EU-wide and 
national registers and the improvement of cooperation between authorities.
Challenges with institutions
Matters related to border security are regulated by EU regulations, including the 
operations of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The regulations 
are approved based on a proposal made by the Commission to the Council and the EU 
Parliament, through an ordinary legislative procedure. In the field of legislation, the 
proactive influence to the Commission during the preparation of the regulation, and 
the influence to the other member states and to the Parliament during the negotiations 
play a key role. The resources are insufficient for continuous influence, which means that 
the influence must be correctly timed and targeted. Otherwise, Finland will be unable to 
achieve its objectives.
Influence is important particularly because the institutions have limited knowledge of 
practical border security issues.
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Challenges with several actors
The maintenance of border security involves measures taken in the countries of origin and 
transit, cooperation with the authorities of the neighbouring countries, measures taken 
on the external border, and measures taken inland. Border security is maintained at the 
land and sea borders and at airports. The number of cooperation partners is very large, 
both nationally and internationally, and they vary by border type. The challenge is greatest 
at the sea borders and in the sea area, where there are more than 300 actors at European 
level, for example, more than 100 of which are related to border security. Border security 
matters are discussed in different forums, some of which are responsible for internal and 
some for external security. The role of EU agencies is also increasing in the field of external 
security.
Connections between internal and external security
Border security operations in all of their forms occur at the interface between internal and 
external security and thus form an integral part of both. Among other things, the recent 
events in Ukraine and Estonia confirm that the relations between states are immediately 
evident on the borders of the state. On the other hand, the interfaces between border 
security operations on the Mediterranean Sea, such as Triton/Poseidon Sea, and crisis 
management operations, such as EUNAVFOR Sophia/Nato, in the fight against illegal 
immigration and prevention of human trafficking, are interconnected. The operational 
areas and the objectives of the operations overlap, making the connection between 
internal and external security clear.  
Illegal immigration, cross-border crime, and hybrid threats cannot be effectively 
intervened in or the border security maintained without cooperation with the countries of 
origin and transit, neighbouring countries, and national authorities. 
The role of border security is emphasised in crisis management operations, and is 
nowadays always a part of the operation. International (worldwide and EU) and national 
support projects in third countries include a border security component.
Border security is maintained to the last before the crisis escalates into a military crisis. 
It is important for the prevention of hybrid threats that, during the so-called grey 
state, the authorities operating at the interface of internal and external security have 
comprehensive competencies and cooperation channels with national authorities and 
those of neighbouring countries.
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Matters to be taken into consideration in the operations
Operating environment
Together with all relevant actors, ensure that each authority has up-to-date and sufficient 
situational awareness. Utilise the situational awareness established by EU agencies and 
institutions (Frontex, Europol, EASO, EEAS, etc.) to a larger degree than before. Support 
endeavours to improve the creation of a shared risk analysis at EU level and, based on this, 
at national level. Utilise the experience of other countries in responding to diverse threats 
and utilising modern technology.
To the extent possible, target the resources available for international operations in a 
coordinated manner in such a way as to best secure Finland's interests.
Take care of contingency planning and preparedness for various situations, including 
resources, tools, and competencies.
Institutions
Influence legislation so that it safeguards international cooperation and participation in 
various cooperation projects and operations. With regard to border security, the decision-
making threshold for participation in international cooperation is not raised. The national 
competent authority must be the competent authority in international cooperation as 
well.
Finnish experts should be brought into important and influential positions in the 
institutions, where they will have an opportunity to exert influence on the contents of 
the legislation during its preparation, and to introduce the practices of the institution to 
border security competence. The border security competence of the EU delegations must 
be reinforced in third countries. Ensure continued competence in national organisations.
Confidential relations are established with the institutions' most important representatives 
with an influence in the matter, and they are supported in their work. Influence is 
exercised in a more planned and targeted manner.
Actors
Ensure that the duties, competencies, and division of responsibilities of the authorities are 
clear with regard to international cooperation in the future, and that the decisions and 
international measures required by the change in the operational environment, such as 
participation in various operations, can be rapid. The responsibility for the decision-maker 
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and/or presenting officer must be unambiguous and must follow the current division of 
responsibilities in all threat situations.
Recognise the key cooperation parties both internationally and nationally, gain their 
commitment, and utilise their competence in order to achieve the objectives. Prioritise 
cooperation and, in addition to bilateral cooperation, aim to find horizontal and/or 
thematic cooperation partners for the government, such as regions, countries, and 
organisations.
4.4  Emergency Services College
A concise description of the key challenges of international cooperation, and concrete 
action and development proposals
From the perspective of the emergency services, international cooperation is made more 
difficult by country-specific differences in the organisations and management systems 
of the emergency services, in legislation, and in the concepts related to security. As an 
example of these concepts, it is somewhat difficult to find an international equivalent 
for the Finnish concept of civil defence ("väestönsuojelu"). Furthermore, some countries 
have their own special legislation for situations that, in Finland, correspond to social 
disturbances during normal conditions or a disturbance during normal conditions. These 
differences are emphasised in situations where Finland needs to ask for international 
assistance for rescue operations or, correspondingly, in a situation where we should send 
assistance abroad.
Significant problems in international cooperation are involved in international conflicts 
that result in a threat to national security, vital functions of society, and the sense of 
security felt by citizens. Sub-government terrorist organisations, states, or alliances 
between states can be the background actors in conflicts. Preparing for these security 
threats requires measures taken by several authorities and organisations. Criminal 
organisations are also part of this group, but the disturbances caused by them are more 
clearly within the purview of the police than the above.
Some of the challenges are related to concerns about the sufficiency of resources. 
The need for international cooperation both in education (professional education 
and continuing professional education) and in research and development is clear. The 
declining economy creates problems and necessitates a balancing act in choosing the 
focus areas of the operations. According to the performance target document of the 
Emergency Services College, we have high-quality and improving educational services, 
the continuity of which must absolutely be secured. The other matters brought up in the 
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performance target document also have a direct impact on internal security with regard to 
the emergency services and also the activities of the Emergency Rescue Centres.
At the organisational level, there are significant challenges facing the cooperation 
between the emergency services and the CMC and its development, particularly related 
to internal security. Know-how and experience in establishing forces for international 
tasks should be utilised when planning the internal security strategy. The matter – the 
interdependence of internal and external security – has been considered in the project in 
the right direction. When examining the current activities, the line between internal and 
external security is artificial, because the activities are nevertheless similar and use similar 
tools. Funding and budgeting pose a challenge to the cooperation.
In the field of education related to the emergency services, it is our view that international 
activities could be of help in finding new procedural solutions. This could be realised by, 
for example, being involved in various projects and programmes deemed to be useful and 
in which we would also have something to give to the other actors. Here, too, we come up 
against the limitations caused by financial resources. On the other hand, the development 
of international activities by specifically utilising our training area and competence could 
produce financial resources through further business education, for which there is clear 
demand in Central Europe.
Views on the connections of internal and external security, and concrete proposals for 
action and development
The Government Report on Security and Defence Policy (2012) states that the external 
and internal security of states is increasingly intertwined with the increase in global 
interdependence. The report does not, however, specifically define external security; 
neither is it defined in the government resolution on overall security (2012). Instead, the 
resolution defines both internal security and overall national defence. The website of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that the border between external and internal security is 
disappearing with the new security problems and cross-border threats.
From the perspectives of professional education in emergency services and ERC activities 
given by the Emergency Services College, and from the perspective of preparedness 
training, there are clear connections between internal and external security. Emergency 
rescue activities that are the responsibility of the emergency services, the closely related 
civil defence activities, and the civil defence tasks defined in the Geneva Conventions and 
their additional protocols have a close, although in some sense indirect, connection with 
external security. Effective preparation for incidents and threats coming from outside 
the borders of the state (international terrorism and other influences on internal security 
from abroad, armed conflicts/war) require the emergency services, as an internal security 
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actor, to carry out both proactive preparations to ensure the prerequisites for protecting 
the population and to maintain the readiness of the emergency services. The connection 
and interdependence with external security and with the actors responsible for external 
security (particularly the Finnish Defence Forces) is necessary to maintain effective civil 
defence arrangements. The role of the emergency services and other traditional internal 
security authorities (the police and the Finnish Border Guard) is thus important in limiting 
the consequences of threats from abroad and in the operations made necessary by 
the threats. According to the view of the Emergency Services College, the visibility and 
publicity of the emergency services should be significantly increased; today, the police 
and the Finnish Defence Forces are emphasised in the activities, while the publicised role 
of the emergency services is smaller than their true value.
Looking at the issue from a wider perspective, external and internal security also have 
a connection in that catastrophes and complex crises occurring in areas near Finland/
Europe may have direct or indirect impacts on internal security and the duties of the 
internal security actors, as in the case of a serious environmental accident in the Gulf of 
Finland, or a nuclear power plant accident in the areas neighbouring Finland, or the crises 
in Ukraine and Syria (uncontrolled growth in the number of legal and illegal immigrants).
The Ministry of the Interior and its administrative branch thus play a key coordinating role 
in serious situations caused by external security threats requiring the protection of the 
population and critical infrastructure, and the maintenance of public order and safety. 
A report should be prepared on the management systems of the emergency services 
in EU countries; plans should also be drawn up on a practical level for participating in 
international emergency rescue operations in Europe, and for accepting international 
assistance in cases of major accidents and disruptions. The threat and risk assessments 
should be harmonised at national, regional, and local levels. Under both emergency 
conditions and in widespread disruptions in normal times, a situation may occur in 
which civil defence is required; indeed, the guidelines on the management system of 
civil defence should be updated. Legislation and guidelines should be developed so that 
the emergency rescue authorities would have the authority to obtain the information 
necessary to maintain overall situational awareness and to coordinate operations 
during disruptions in normal times, where the population or functions vital to society 
are threatened by an accident. The prerequisites for coordinating emergency rescue 
operations should be ensured in order to prepare for disruptions where the impact 
reaches the area of several different emergency services. From the perspective of 
developing coordination between emergency service areas, there is cause to consider 
whether regional leadership is required. There is cause to further develop the reporting to 
the Ministry of the Interior.
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4.5  Crisis Management Centre
Description of the key challenges of international cooperation
The Kuopio-based Crisis Management Centre is a competence centre for civilian crisis 
management and international emergency services. Its main duties are training experts 
for international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding and international emergency 
service missions, recruitment of experts, responsibility for logistics and materiel 
readiness, and research, publishing, and project activities related to the field. The Crisis 
Management Centre acts as the national command centre for all experts sent on civilian 
crisis management and international emergency service missions, and is responsible for all 
operations related to national readiness. The Crisis Management Centre is a national actor, 
the operational area of which is strongly international. 
The field of international crisis management is undergoing a constant change. The 
international community, particularly the European Union, has assumed and continues 
to assume a role in crises located further and further from Europe, and is increasingly 
multidimensional and challenging due to, for example, the conditions and the security 
situation. It seems evident that the focus of civilian crisis management is moving to 
Africa and, should the situation allow, also to the Middle East. The changes in the focus of 
participation and the increasingly diverse missions require the countries and competence 
centres participating in civilian crisis management to have the ability to adapt to the 
prevailing conditions. The National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management (2014, vision) 
states that Finland is a frontrunner in civilian crisis management. The Crisis Management 
Centre must therefore be able to adapt to new challenges in a proactive manner. This 
requires continuous, open-minded examination of the duties, organisation, and activities 
of the Crisis Management Centre, and the ability to adapt rapidly to the requirements. This 
is also emphasised in the international emergency rescue service missions (the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism; Voluntary Pool). 
With the change in the crisis management sector, the maintenance of international 
situational awareness is highlighted. The international cooperation of the Crisis 
Management Centre faces the challenge of limited situational awareness, which limits 
the ability to predict future situations and, on the other hand, makes it more difficult to 
develop activities.
The recruitment of Finnish experts for international duties, and therefore international 
cooperation, faces the challenge of the Finnish candidates having to compete for the 
duties with other international applicants. The expected ramping-down in stages of 
the EU's largest civilian crisis management operations – EULEX Kosovo and EUPOL 
Afghanistan – and the resulting reduction in positions open for application will, in 
the future, mean increased competition for the different positions in EU-led civilian 
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crisis management operations. Getting experts for operations requires international 
cooperation, as the organisation who announces the open position will make the 
selection. 
Anticipating the need for experts for international operations faces the challenge of what 
kind of know-how and background is expected from the experts: this also affects planning 
for training the experts to be sent on future missions and the selection of the experts to be 
trained. The training also faces the challenge of having to meet the varying needs of the 
operations, for example in accordance with the requirements set by the EU and the UN. 
This requires continuous monitoring and agility to implement changes and, on the other 
hand, also sufficient financial resources. Cooperation is also necessary with national actors 
so that synergy benefits can be achieved with other Finnish security sector actors through 
training arranged in Finland. 
In project, research, and development work, the greatest challenge for the Crisis 
Management Centre in international civilian crisis management cooperation is related 
to finding suitable international partners and implementing the cooperation. Research 
also requires sufficient financial resources, which emphasises seeking external funding 
and access to international project funding application processes. The challenge is to 
customise the research and project themes in such a way that they are topical and meet 
international and national needs. The results achieved also need to be distributed widely 
among the target groups, which requires continuous and wide-ranging monitoring of the 
activities of international actors in the field, and participation in these activities.
Views on the connections between internal and external security  
In Finland, the Crisis Management Centre is an international actor, one of the key duties 
of which is to implement the European Union's common security and defence policy in 
accordance with Finland's interests, under the governance of the Ministry of the Interior. 
The activities of the Crisis Management Centre concentrate on deploying Finnish experts 
on international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding, and international emergency 
rescue service missions. Although the Crisis Management Centre's field of operations is 
worldwide, the majority of its activities take place within the frameworks of the European 
Union's civilian crisis management and emergency rescue service operations, and of 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE. A significant number of 
the EU's civilian crisis management operations aim to develop and reinforce the police, 
the rule of law, and border security in their target areas, so Finland's participation in 
international civilian crisis management missions is part of an EU-wide approach to 
responding to various internal security threats, such as terrorism, cross-border crime, and 
other serious and organised crime. 
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In accordance with the European Union's Internal Security Strategy, it is important to 
increase the participation of the law enforcement authorities and judicial, freedom, and 
security sector bodies of the member states in civilian crisis management operations. The 
European Union's decision on civilian crisis management operations to be established, 
just like requests from the UN and the OSCE for experts for civilian crisis management and 
peacebuilding operations, affect how Finland's – and thus, the Crisis Management Centre's 
– international cooperation is built up. The same applies to participation in international 
emergency rescue service missions. The connection between external and internal 
security is an important factor in defining the work of the Crisis Management Centre, and 
the CMC is a unique international actor with activities that experts can use to improve 
their knowledge and skills on international missions, to support Finland's internal security 
and the actors responsible for it. The national experts sent by the Crisis Management 
Centre on international missions are expected to increase the national capability to 
respond to national security challenges linked to threats from outside Finland. The 
possibility of this occurring is excellent, as around 50 per cent of those sent to expert 
secondments have positions in the organisations responsible for the internal security of 
Finland (the emergency services, the police, the Finnish Border Guard, Customs and the 
Ministry of Justice).
Experts sent by the Crisis Management Centre handle civilian crisis management 
duties in precisely those areas that project security threats into Europe and further into 
Finland, allowing them to amass a very high level of knowledge and understanding of 
the problems in the crisis area, their causes, and the possibilities for resolving them. 
At the same time, working on international missions increases their knowledge of the 
international actors and builds contacts with them. This supports information exchange 
and possibilities of cooperation between EU actors, promoting the work carried out at the 
interface of Finland's internal and external security. 
In addition to civilian crisis management tasks, the readiness and capabilities created 
by the Crisis Management Centre for international emergency rescue service missions 
reinforce national internal security, as this readiness (such as search and rescue equipment 
and know-how for rescuing victims buried in rubble) can also be used domestically, if 
necessary.
Concrete proposals for action and development  
Putting the knowledge and know-how amassed by experts representing internal security 
actors on international missions into practice requires cross-administration cooperation. 
The proposal is to support the creation or updating of the internationality strategies 
of the organisations responsible for the internal security of Finland. The objective of 
the strategies must be both to utilise international work experience in reinforcing the 
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skills and knowledge of the organisations working for Finland's internal security and 
to support participation in international missions as part of the career development of 
their personnel. This can be further supported by recommending the preparation of an 
implementation plan.
Another proposal is that the internal security strategy currently under development 
should propose an increase in cooperation between the parties responsible for Finland's 
internal security, particularly in advancing the recruitment of experts to be sent on 
international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding, and international emergency and 
rescue service missions.
4.6  Emergency Response Centre Administration
The ERC Administration's views on the interdependencies of internal and external 
security and the development of cooperation between the security authorities
In accordance with Section 2 of the Government Decree on the Ministry of the Interior, 
the Emergency Response Centre Administration is under the purview of the Ministry of 
the Interior. It is the national central agency, governed and supervised by the ministry. 
However, the operational steering is done jointly with the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health. Governance and supervision are a key duty of a government ministry mentioned 
in Section 68 of the Constitution of Finland, and each ministry, within its proper purview, 
is responsible for the preparation of matters to be considered by the government and 
for the appropriate functioning of its administration. The agency itself is responsible 
for resolving and arranging its operations and the related administrative and support 
services.
Emergency response centre operations are not defined in the legislation as a concept, 
but Section 4 of the Emergency Response Centre Act lays down provisions on the duties 
of the ERC Administration. According to this, the agency's duties are the production of 
emergency response centre services, supporting the related operations of the emergency 
services, police, and social and healthcare, communications centre duties, initiating 
measures to warn the population, and other duties related to supporting the operations 
of the authorities that are purposeful for the agency. In addition to these, the duties of 
the ERC Administration include developing and monitoring of the duties and procedures 
related to its field.
Emergency response centre services mean the reception and assessment of emergency 
calls, and other such calls that require immediate measures by the emergency service, 
police, or social and health service authorities, and relaying the task in accordance with 
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the instructions provided by the authorities to the proper authority or the party handling 
the duties of the authority according to an agreement.
Emergency response centre operations (112 operations) are among the most vital 
functions that have a direct impact on trust in the authorities and society. The ERC 
Administration is a key actor in society's security sector and in the production of 
internal security situational awareness. In emergency situations, it is the central hub of 
communications and plays a key role with regard to society's crisis tolerance. However, 
the chain is only as strong as its weakest link. For this reason, developing the cooperation 
between the authorities will be even more important in the future.
The changing security environment from the ERC Administration's perspective
In 1991, as many as 133 different public-safety answering points or emergency response 
centres operated in Finland, with a total staff of several thousands. With the emergency 
response centre reform of the 2000s, 15 emergency response centres were established 
in Finland, and today, as a result of the ERC Administration's restructuring, there are six 
emergency response centres.
As the complexity of society increases and the population becomes older, the 112 
operations will become even more demanding. Events threatening our security have 
become increasingly unexpected and diverse. The role of cooperation between authorities 
in the preparedness of society will be further emphasised with the transformed security 
environment.
The operational environment has changed both domestically and internationally. Among 
other things, digitalisation, changes in demographics and regional structures, technical 
development with common information systems for the authorities, and changes 
taking place in the authorities will increase the service expectations and productivity 
requirements of cooperation between the authorities. The citizens' sense of security stems 
from experiences and notions, and trust in the security authorities being able to react 
rapidly and effectively to threats when necessary.
The security of citizens does not depend only on the development of military threats, 
terrorism, or organised crime. The functioning of social networks, health care services, 
education, employment, public order and safety, and, for example, the management of 
daily accidents are more central to everyday life.
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The police
The distress of citizens is evident in the spectrum of emergency calls processed by the 
ERC Administration. The number of police calls related to the protection of life and health 
recorded in the ERC Administration's information system has increased by 11 per cent 
from 2009 to 2015, and the growth appears to be continuing. At the same time, from 
the perspective of the ERC Administration, domestic violence calls and other calls of an 
emergency nature made to homes have remained at the same level for these seven years. 
Following an emergency call, 51 per cent of the calls relayed to the different sectors 
(including unprompted calls made by patrols) went to the police. The diversity of police 
calls also sets special competence requirements on emergency centre work. The savings 
objectives allocated to the police will create more challenges for emergency centre 
operations as the number of units in the field decreases, when incidents result in more 
emergency calls due to increased response times, and the need for advice related to 
emergencies increases. These factors highlight the importance of cooperation between 
the authorities.
Lowering the overall response time of the police requires the rapid handling of emergency 
calls at the emergency response centre, high-quality risk assessment, and successful use 
of emergency resources for the emergency response. This will result in improved public 
order and safety, reduced opportunity for crime, an improved crime-solving percentage, 
prevention of the escalation of situations involving violence, and thus less damage to 
property and fewer injuries to persons.
Rescue services
The number of accidents to which rescue services have responded has remained at the 
same level for the last three years. The ERC activities also affect the response time of the 
rescue services, which, in turn, is a significant factor in the possible escalation of accidents 
and fires. 
Of the missions relayed to the different sectors as a result of an emergency call, six per 
cent were relayed to the rescue services, including to first responder missions that are 
part of the purview of the emergency medical services. The cooperation between the ERC 
Administration and the rescue services faces the additional challenges posed by municipal 
autonomy on the nationwide steering of the operations and development work and by 
the fact that a significant number of rescue service missions are carried out by contract 
fire departments. The currently ongoing rescue services reform project introduces an 
additional need for active cooperation between authorities.
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Health care services
Following an emergency call, 42 per cent of the calls relayed to the different sectors went 
to the health care services. The total number of health care calls handled by the ERC 
Administration has remained at the same level for the last four years, but their nature 
is changing. The number of elderly people living alone is increasing. Increasingly often, 
those requesting assistance using the emergency number are elderly people who have 
multiple illnesses and whose request for emergency assistance is caused by nonspecific 
symptoms for which the health care risk assessment instructions do not provide a clear 
procedure. At the same time, acute situations must be identified quickly, because an 
increase in delays may, as a result of various treatments being given too late, cause more 
expensive treatment processes and longer rehabilitation times, at worst even unnecessary 
loss of life.
Emergency medical aid missions are integral to protecting the life and health of citizens, 
and thus place particular competence requirements for ERC operations. An additional 
challenge has been the right of the hospital districts to decide on their procedures 
independently. 
In recent years, cooperation between the authorities has developed, and this has helped 
in achieving significant improvements in the procedures and guidelines of the health care 
sector with ERC operations in mind.
The currently ongoing social and health care sector reform project will bring new 
challenges that will require good cooperation between the authorities in the future, too. 
Social services
Social services are the fastest growing sector in the 112 operations. In the last seven years, 
the number of emergency calls for social services has increased by 50 per cent; however, it 
still remains below one per cent of all emergency calls handled by the ERCs.
The increase in the number of social service calls is connected with the ageing of the 
population and the longer time living at home, and the increase in the number of child 
protection calls. To ERC operations, social services also appear as a municipal and thus 
regionally differently arranged function that places challenges on achieving nationwide 
procedures. However, significant development has taken place for social services over 
recent years, with ERC operations in mind. This is a result of changes in legislation and 
guidelines for the sector, which have significantly improved the cooperation between 
the municipalities. The cooperation with the ERC Administration has shown positive 
development, and it must be further developed with regard to the future reform of social 
and health care services.
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Despite the slight decrease in the overall number of emergency calls in recent years, 
the number of relayed missions and the working time spent on handling the missions 
have grown over the same period. This causes a constant need for prioritisation in the 
distribution of the ERC Administration's resources. The changes taking place among the 
authorities place additional requirements on the cooperation between the authorities and 
its procedures.
High-quality ERC operations continue to be a basic requirement for the sufficiency of the 
field resources of the other sectors. On an annual level, the handling of almost one million 
emergency calls, and one million other calls without alerting the authorities, is an essential 
part of the functioning of the entire chain of assistance.
ERICA, the common ERC information system for authorities
In order to develop future ERC operations, the ERC Administration and the other security 
authorities launched an operations and IT development project (TOTI) in 2008, with the 
objective of achieving an ERC information system that is nationwide and in the common 
use of all actors participating in ERC operations (the police, fire and rescue, social and 
health care, and the Finnish Border Guard). From the start, full-time experts from each 
authority have been involved in the development of the system, and in the future, the ERC 
information system will be used from the authorities' own points of use, which enables 
closer cooperation than before and the sharing of situational awareness among the entire 
chain of assistance; the new forms of cooperation will also create synergies.
As a nationally centralised and advanced information system, ERICA will enable the 
ERC operations to be developed and made more uniform and efficient in such a way 
that citizens can be ensured equal and high-quality ERC services and rapid assistance 
regardless of their geographical location. At the same time, the operations and resource 
use of all authorities in the 112 chain can be made more efficient.
Cooperation in the neighbouring areas and international cooperation between  
ERCs from the perspective of the ERC Administration
The ERC Administration works in cooperation with the corresponding organisations in the 
neighbouring areas, such as the Swedish SOS Alarm, Estonian Häirekeskus, and the ERC 
system of the Norwegian health care services. In practice, the cooperation has, at this level, 
been based on mutual comparisons and development of the systems and procedures.
At the operational level, cooperation takes place particularly in Northern Finland, where 
the Oulu ERC is in daily practical cooperation with both SOS Alarm, handling Swedish ERC 
operations, and the Norwegian emergency medical service authorities in cross-border 
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emergency operations, particularly with regard to the emergency medical service units. 
These operations are based on agreements on health care services. 
The police force also cooperates across borders with the other Nordic countries. This 
cooperation is based on international conventions, EU law, and the national legislation of 
each country. Furthermore, an agreement on police cooperation has been made between 
the Nordic countries. This was last revised on 1 October 2012, which affects ERC operations 
with respect to alerting the authorities. This cooperation is also being developed towards 
joint patrols and the possible use of common communications equipment, which will 
likely affect the operations of the ERCs.
In the case of the rescue services, the corresponding cooperation is based on the following 
agreements, for example: the Barents Euro-Arctic Emergency Response Service Agreement 
of 2008 (HE139/2011), which covers the areas of the former provinces of Oulu and 
Lapland; and the agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden on cross-
border cooperation during accidents (decree and agreement 21/1992). This cooperation 
is evident in Haaparanta, for example, where the rescue services of the different countries 
have equipment in common use.
The entire eastern border is covered by the Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Finland and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation to 
avert disasters and to prevent their consequences (52/1996). Based on this agreement, 
the Kuopio ERC and Oulu ERC act as points of contact with the corresponding parties in 
the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations. With reference the agreement in question, 
the rescue services in the border region can also make their own cooperation agreements 
with the corresponding parties in the neighbouring country.
The current challenge that the cooperation between neighbouring areas faces is that no 
intergovernmental agreements exist with Russia for the remit of the Ministry for Social 
Affairs and Health. This has come up several times, particularly in the region of Southeast 
Finland, where traffic accidents have occurred between Vaalimaa and Viipuri. In these 
cases, it is possible to send a Finnish rescue unit to the accident site but not a health care 
unit, which has, in some cases, caused confusion when the emergency call has been 
received in Finland. 
The ERC Administration also cooperates with the ERCs of other countries in situations 
where the emergency call is received in Finland, but the emergency occurs in another 
country, or vice versa. A separate list of ERC contact number exists for this purpose, 
currently including most of the countries in the EU area. To a large extent, this cooperation 
involves matters that are also in the remit of the consul services of the Ministry for Foreign 
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Affairs, and the matters are prepared jointly by the ERC Administration and the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs.
European ERC operations
There are a total of around 5,000 emergency rescue centres in Europe. On average, there is 
one ERC for a population base of around 200,000. This is not the target state; the political 
will has not been found to implement the change required in many countries. Even in 
a country the size of Sweden, there are 40 different public-safety answering points or 
emergency response centres participating in the handling of emergency calls in one 
way or another. In Norway, there are 65 such centres. The report on the Utoya terrorist 
attack mentions that problems included the lack of an ERC common to all authorities, 
fragmented situational awareness, deficiencies in information flow between the 
authorities, and the vulnerability of ERCs that are too small.
The emergency number 112 works in all EU countries, but its implementation varies. In 
addition to the common emergency number, the authorities can also have their own 
emergency numbers (e.g. Germany, Norway) that persons in distress can call to request 
assistance from the authority in question. If other authorities are also needed in such 
situations, the call is transferred and/or the information is forwarded to the ERCs of the 
other authorities. In the UK, for example, calls to the common emergency number 112 or 
999 are directed to a telephone operator who directs the call to the authority desired by 
the caller.
The Finnish model, in which the same organisation (the ERC Administration) receives 
emergency calls for all sectors via a single emergency number, handles the information 
and uses the same information system to alert all units, does not exist elsewhere in the 
same form.
The European Emergency Number Association EENA and the North American National 
Emergency Number Association NENA
The European Emergency Number Association EENA is an association established in 1999. 
Its mission is to promote awareness of the common emergency number 112 and the 
high-level emergency mission-related services available through it in the EU. EENA acts 
as a discussion forum for all parties involved in 112 operations, such as the authorities, 
decision-makers, associations, and commercial actors. EENA has members from more 
than 80 countries, including more than 200 members of the European Parliament, 15 
international organisations, and more than 90 researchers.
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The annual EENA conference acts as an international forum of experts, allowing the 
possibility of exchanging information on the best practices and new innovations. It has 
been established in these conferences that there are large differences in the development 
of ERC operations between different European countries, and that Finland is a forerunner 
in this development. 
Each year, EENA grants awards to individuals and organisations that have done significant 
deeds or achieved excellent results related to the emergency number 112. In 2013, the 
ERC Administration received an award in the Outstanding National 112 System category. 
According to the award, Finland's ERC system is the best implementation in Europe. 
In addition to Europe, the award in question has resulted in contacts from countries 
including the United States, China, and Australia.
In 2014, EENA awarded the ERC Administration and the Finnish Police international 
recognition of good cooperation for the successful rescue of an 8-year-old girl. The Finnish 
cooperation between authorities is internationally top-grade in many ways, because the 
interdependencies have been identified and things are done together beginning from the 
planning stage.
The National Emergency Number Association NENA coordinates the development work in 
the field in North America. Finland has been brought up often in these seminars as well, 
and the Finnish ERC operations have been presented at different events in recent years. 
The networked operating model, the 112 Suomi smartphone application, the cooperation 
between the authorities, and the training of the ERC duty personnel are topics that have 
been presented as a model to representatives from the thousands of separate ERCs in 
North America.
Finnish ERC operations raise interest
From an international perspective, Finland has an efficient ERC system, and we are in 
many ways a model country in how to implement the operations. The ERC Administration 
constantly receives international visitors, and we have actively assisted different countries, 
such as Sweden, Georgia, Estonia, and Australia, in their own reforms at both strategic and 
practical levels. Articles on Finnish ERC operations have also been regularly published in 
global publications in the field. 
The ERC Administration has also been requested to submit a separate report on the 
implemented ERC reform for the use of EENA members. The report was published on 
EENA's website in 2015, and it has raised plenty of discussion.
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The implementation of ERC operations under the responsibility of one authority has 
been a particular subject of interest. The Netherlands, for example, is planning an ERC 
model common to all authorities, but the cultural challenges of cooperation between the 
authorities are greater there than here. International visitors have also been interested 
in the ERC duty staff as their own profession, the diverse work of the duty staff, and the 
related training and its length. 
An international review group has visited Finland to familiarise itself with the Finnish 
ERC operations and perform a peer review of matters related to risk management in 
Finland. The secretariat of the review group, which was satisfied with what it saw, included 
representatives of the European Commission, the UNISDR organisation that concentrates 
on disaster reduction under the UN, and the OECD.
Other international discussions have involved, for example, legislation related to 
emergency call traffic, the distribution of costs, service provider disruptions, SMS alerts, 
location systems, and the security level of the technical systems. Furthermore, similar 
challenges are involved in the implementation of the eCall system or the AML locator 
model in different countries.
As part of the development of Swedish ERC operations, a proposal was submitted to 
the government of Sweden in 2013 concerning the implementation of ERC services in 
Sweden. The measures presented in the report, such as a national ERC service, legislation 
reform, and the development and harmonisation of the ERC information system, had been 
influenced by the Finnish model.
International development work
All the Nordic countries are currently creating specifications for emergency medical care 
data. The goal is to create common data specifications for an electronic medical care 
report for the Nordic countries; in Finland, it will be a part of the KEJO system, which is a 
field command system in common use by authorities like ERICA.
Common quality metrics can be created based on these common data specifications. In 
the future, international cooperation will also enable a better comparison of the systems 
in the ERCs.
The ERC Administration has participated in the EU Commission's expansion and 
neighbourhood projects as an expert with respect to the development of ERC operations. 
The Finnish model for ERC operations has been presented at, for example, the Twinning/
TAIEX seminar arranged by the EU Commission and the Georgian Ministry for Internal 
Affairs, where different EU countries shared experiences on how they have resolved 
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various issues related to ERC operations, such as emergency location, the integration of 
ERC services, and the blocking of calls that should not be received by the ERCs. Finland 
also participated in the expert seminar arranged in Georgia under the TAIEX programme 
in June 2016. The theme of the seminar was how to establish and share situational 
awareness with the different authorities in widespread crises.
However, international cooperation is not one-sided for Finland. In Estonia, for example, 
a new ERC information system has already been deployed, enabling the implementation 
of a networked operating model. Active cooperation between neighbouring areas has 
been going on between countries for years, now, and Finland has the possibility to obtain 
experiences and views on networked ERC operations from Estonia.
Security cooperation in the future
The 112 chain, beginning with an ERC, has a direct impact on the services provided to 
citizens by the police, social and health services, and rescue services. The maintenance 
of public order and safety, responding to property damage and personal injury, and 
speeding up the start of medical care reduce costs incurred by delays. The efficient 
handling of ERC tasks, successful risk assessment, and high-quality use of emergency 
rescue resources improve the results of the operations of the different authorities.
Digitalisation, for its part, increases the efficiency of security cooperation. Examples of 
this are the 112 Suomi-application and the Smart Locator -service, which are already in 
use and have helped, for example, lost persons find their way back to their route without 
extensive and expensive search and rescue operations by the authorities.
The effectiveness of the urgent support services provided by the ERC Administration 
promotes occupational safety and the flow of information in situations requiring warnings 
to the public, for instance. The ability to prepare for various disturbances during normal 
conditions and unusual conditions has a significant impact on overall security.
Due to changes in the international operational environment, internal and external 
security can no longer be told apart. The terrorism experienced in Europe can arrive in 
Finland at any time. Preparations must be made for this eventuality in the operational 
guidelines and procedures of the security authorities. This will be helped by ERICA, the 
common ERC information system for authorities, which will aid in creating and sharing 
real-time situational awareness among all actors.
Obtaining reliable situational awareness of rapidly changing events will, in the future, be 
increasingly important. In anticipatory situational awareness, information shared by the 
authorities on their everyday operations, and its analysis as part of big data, is emphasised. 
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The role of the ERC Administration as the forwarder of initial information to the actors 
in the different administrative branches and to the general public has continued to 
increase, and the information system architecture for the security authorities currently 
being developed will further emphasise this role. The importance of ERC operations will 
be emphasised even further in the threat scenarios of hybrid warfare and cybersecurity, 
in which operations will likely be led by the internal security authorities before the 
competencies of the Finnish Defence Forces are increased through preparedness 
legislation. Taking the above-mentioned interdependencies into consideration, the ERC 
Administration must possess the ability to carry out its duties in normal conditions, during 
various disturbances, and in unusual conditions.
The Ministry of the Interior's administrative branch in the field of the security 
authorities
The development of ERC operations must be continued in cooperation with the other 
security authorities so that the service expectations of the general public and the 
authorities can be met in the form of new service models. The implementation of next-
generation ERC services and Finland's status as a leading country in cooperation between 
the authorities must be ensured.
In order for the Ministry of the Interior to reinforce its role as the leading security authority, 
it must exert active influence to make cross-administration cooperation more in-depth 
and efficient, and to clarify the duties, division of competencies, and coordination 
responsibilities of the security authorities.
4.7  Finnish Immigration Service
The Finnish Immigration Service (Migri) operates at an interesting interface between 
internal and external security, where foreign citizens entering and staying in the country, 
and their affairs being processed in the agency, link the above-mentioned security aspects 
to each other. Persons coming into Finland from abroad may be escaping a threat they 
are facing abroad, and they may thus bring elements of conflict into Finland as well. Their 
purpose of coming to Finland can also have the intent of disrupting Finland's internal 
security. 
The events of the current year in Europe have shown that there is cause for a rapid 
reassessment of the concepts of internal and external security. There is also an acute need 
for this reassessment in the immigration sector. Many of the key processes for which the 
Finnish Immigration Service has development and risk management responsibility are 
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closely connected with this topic. Multiple citizenship as a risk factor and the radicalisation 
of immigrants in Finland have been a topic of public discussion. 
In recent years, the Finnish Immigration Service has intensely developed the smoothness 
and production efficiency of key processes related to immigration, international 
protection, and citizenship. The ability of the UMA case management system deployed 
in Finland simultaneously in 2010 for all authorities involved in the immigration, 
international protection, and citizenship processes, to serve all the authorities in handling 
affairs within their remit, has improved year by year.
Challenges and connections 
The Finnish Immigration Service is committed in many ways to operating as part of the 
common European international protection system and, on the other hand, to being 
involved in the cooperation between the European immigration services, for example 
through the GDISC operations. The development of the European Asylum Support Office 
EASO is strongly evident in the agency's operations as new duties but, on the other hand, 
also as new opportunities. A strong developmental aspect of operations is connected 
to the above-mentioned cooperation, which is welcome and has benefited the agency. 
The challenge of this kind of cooperation is that the agencies of several other member 
states are larger and they have better resources for cooperation. Because it has fewer 
staff, it is more difficult for the Finnish Immigration Service to participate in all available 
cooperation, even if it is useful; on the other hand, being involved in cooperation 
requires an investment in activities of a more representative nature that do not directly 
benefit the agency's operations. The challenge is that the human resources available for 
international cooperation tasks are scarce, and the agency has not had an international 
affairs strategy derived from the objectives of the Ministry of the Interior that would also 
affect the agency's performance objectives. The international affairs strategy should also 
be developed, taking the security aspect into consideration. At this time, participation in 
international cooperation is mostly governed by the needs of the agency's operations.   
In Finland, the framework of international protection is formed of international 
agreements and extensive EU standards binding to Finland. The implementation of the 
regulations between the EU member states is not harmonisation, however, which is a 
cause of disruption. Examples of this include the deficiencies in the reception conditions 
in Italy and Greece, which leads to the incomplete implementation of the regulations 
concerning the processing of asylum applications. In the field of immigration and 
international protection, the EU's common regulations, and their success or failure, play a 
central role. In this sense, the challenges also exist at EU policy level, and the Ministry of 
the Interior's immigration department will likely present more detailed views on them. 
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The conditions in certain countries of origin are the key challenge in international 
cooperation, as they can prevent a person with no grounds for staying in their country 
from being returned to their home country. Their return may also be prevented by the 
home country's unwillingness to receive a person who has, for example, committed 
crimes in Finland. In international protection matters, checking a person's background and 
verifying their claims of persecution by their home country are difficult and often entirely 
prevented.  
The ability to make return agreements can be affected by not being able to offer a 
sufficient incentive to the partner to take back their own citizens. Some countries also 
expect so-called forced returns to be given return support. Return issues also have a 
significant connection with Finland's development cooperation. There are obstacles 
involved with this issue, caused by Finland's development aid policy. The efficient return 
to their home country of persons residing in the country without grounds is one element 
of a believable immigration policy. The need to connect voluntary returns and returns 
executed by the police in such a way that Finland appears as a single, uniform actor 
from the perspective of the recipient countries can also be seen as a kind of challenge or 
development target in the near future. 
Operations at the interface of internal and external security also require a presence in the 
countries of origin of the people coming to Finland. Checking the backgrounds of persons 
applying for a residence permit in Finland for decision-making, in accordance with the 
Aliens Act. It is a question of whether the information and documents concerning the 
permit requirements provided by the persons themselves can be relied on or not. The new 
internal affairs funds, particularly the ISF fund, include possibilities to fund immigration 
liaisons in important countries of origin. The European colleague agencies have highly 
developed ILO operations. In Finland, ILO operations, particularly with regard to the duties 
of the Finnish Immigration Service, are only beginning to develop. The challenge once 
again consists of the scant resources and also the fact that, due to the lack of resources, 
ILO provides services or is expected to provide services to several organisations in Finland, 
which inevitably leads to some organisations not finding joint ILO operations as beneficial 
to their operations as others do. The challenge would be to develop ILO operations and 
establish them in the structure of immigration management, or, on the other hand, to 
develop a model in which Migri itself could operate abroad and determine the grounds for 
a residence permit, if necessary. In 2016, the Finnish Immigration Service received funding 
for the RIO project, in which a rotating immigration official function is piloted.
As stated above, the agency's remit as such is located in the interface of internal 
and external security, although its basic duties involve the processing of matters in 
an administrative procedure. Cooperation with colleague agencies is an important 
opportunity to obtain information on phenomena, including those affecting internal 
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security, and the best practices of other countries. The operations of the Finnish 
Immigration Service involve the processing and storage of a lot of information that 
could, when properly analysed, have internal security implications. However, the Finnish 
Immigration Service's own analysis operations are not very advanced and, on the other 
hand, it cannot concentrate on the security aspect due to its sector. There are no separate 
resources for analysis, with the exception of investigation into country of origin. In 2015 
and 2016, the Finnish Immigration Service started to develop its analysis operations, and it 
has particularly developed situational awareness of asylum issues. Situational awareness is 
also developed in cooperation with the police. In order to safeguard sufficient acquisition 
of information and to ensure the timely flow of information, the National Bureau of 
Investigation established a centralised function related to the asylum process and 
supporting crime prevention and security on 1 April 2016, with participation from officials 
of the Finnish Immigration Service.
Development  
The Finnish Immigration Service can develop its international affairs strategy further, 
taking the internal and external security implications into consideration. Security 
implications and the need for analysis will be taken into consideration in the development 
of the information system. HR management and staff competence is developed 
taking the agency's remit, where the internal and external security implications meet, 
into consideration. The objective is to support a balanced and realistic professional 
identity in a sector in which the requirements of providing international protection and 
implementation of human rights have a simultaneous influence on internal security 
implications, and in which there has been a constantly increasing need for international 
cooperation, at least thus far.
As mentioned above, ILO operations, or another presence abroad related to investigating 
the grounds for residence permits in the immigration administration, need to be 
developed in such a way that the needs of all actors can be met as well as possible. The 
Finnish Immigration Service is also planning to develop this issue through the position of 
a rotating immigration official, implemented as a project possibly partially funded by the 
AMIF fund.
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5  Views established based on the project 
workshop and recommendations for 
the development of the operational 
prerequisites and cooperation of the 
security actors
The development inputs that arose in the operational context of the interdependence of 
internal and external security for the development of the operational prerequisites and 
cooperation of the security actors were processed by means of a cross-administration 
workshop at the House of Estates on 2 June 2016. A total of 23 experts from the 
administrative branches of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, and the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs participated in the workshop. Based on the workshop process, 
the focus areas of the development of the operations and cooperation of the security 
actors in the changed operational environment were determined to be: 1) development 
of the usability and shareability of information, 2) definition and shared 
interpretation of shared interests and goals concerning the security environment, 
3) development of flexible cooperation models, 4) improvement of the flexibility of 
decision-making, and 5) improvement of the up-to-dateness and flexibility of the 
practices related to the definition of jurisdiction, and preparedness (Table 1).
1. Development of the usability and shareability of information  
Better availability and usability of key international-level intelligence with respect to the 
strategic planning of the activities of the authorities and operations has been found to 
be a key development target compared to the prevailing situation. The concentration of 
international information within a limited number of security authorities is considered 
to be a challenge, because the flow and usability of the information among the security 
authorities is currently not complete enough. In this respect, the availability of 
international information, and more even communication between the security 
actors who need the information in their operations, forms an essential development 
aspect. Practical examples of the security actors' information acquisition possibilities 
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that have been found to be deficient include the information acquisition possibilities 
of legislative authorities during the processing of cyberthreats, and ensuring the 
information acquisition possibilities of national authorities for crimes that were 
committed abroad. 
The national legislation has also been found to limit the possibility of the security actors 
to obtain information relevant to their operations to the necessary extent, and practical 
examples in this context include the availability of background information on asylum 
seekers and information acquisition related to crime prevention. In this respect, the 
development challenges of the usability and shareability of information are linked to the 
need to develop national legislation to match the current operational environment. 
As a result of the immigration crisis, communication practices have also been found to 
have improved to some extent, as the more efficient information sharing between the 
Finnish Security Intelligence Service and the local authorities proves. It is hoped that the 
improved practices will result in the future development of information exchange in a 
wider sense, on the scale of the operational culture. 
Operating in the increasingly complex security context requires multichannel and 
rapid information exchange from the security actors in order to establish up-to-date 
situational awareness that supports anticipation. In addition to official information 
exchange channels, the importance of unofficial information exchange channels 
and measures has increased in comparison to development. In order to respond to the 
development of the operational environment, a key action proposal is considered to be 
the strengthening of operating models supporting unofficial information exchange 
between organisations and actors. The development of the operating models must 
take into consideration both acute changes in the security environment requiring an 
immediate response, and the monitoring and anticipation of the long-term development 
of the operational environment. The central government's staff rotation is a concrete 
way of reinforcing mutual familiarity and increasing information exchange; it promotes 
the networking of experts and thus promotes learning that crosses the borders of the 
organisations' operating cultures. Developing and establishing cross-administration 
operating models, such as central government staff rotation, is a route towards a new 
type of operating culture in the future. 
These operating models make the security actors' familiarity with each other's expertise 
more in-depth and lowers the barriers between sectors, which are still considered to be 
a key element that slows down horizontal information exchange. The best practices in 
unofficial information exchange, such as expert forums of a "shared interest group" 
type assembling around a common topic without an official decision in order to meet 
the challenges of a major security phenomenon, and networks of contacts, increase the 
familiarity of the authorities with each other and reinforce information exchange 
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across organisational borders with the actors who need the information. Reinforcing 
the practices of unofficial information exchange also decreases the direct dependence on 
official information organised according to the hierarchy and bound to its structures. 
The sectors possess registered information related to their own operational context, and 
from the perspective of shareability of information, the combination of sector-specific 
register information with more extensive database pools is seen as a measure worth 
developing. It is hoped that legislative development will support this development effort 
in the future. Understanding the importance of the information capital accumulated 
during security context practices, tacit knowledge, and efforts to improve its usability 
are also seen as potential key developments in the security culture. Examined at 
organisational level, it is considered to be necessary to develop the operational culture 
in a direction where joint discussions are seen as a method of working, and where low-
threshold procedures are systematically supported to raise ideas related to the 
development of the security context at all organisational levels.
In order to promote the shareability and acquisition of information, we propose a more 
critical and more case-specific assessment of measures that limit the usability of 
documents. The usability of secret documents is very limited and, correspondingly, 
the information related to the documents can be utilised only by a small number of 
actors. Classifying information, and thus limiting its distribution, should be considered 
in a more case-specific manner and per each party requiring the information. Examined 
from a solution-oriented perspective, it should be assessed whether it would be more 
purposeful to classify the information as confidential instead of secret, in order 
to enable its shareability and usability for key actors on a wider scale. In order to 
improve the usability of the reports, it is further proposed that it should be possible to 
add a note to them mentioning that the information presented in the report can be 
shared with the key actors who need it. Updating the existing distribution lists and a 
clear definition of the updating responsibility are also seen as a development dimension. 
These practices aim to promote an operational culture that makes the horizontal 
transfer of information easier from the source to the key actors who need it in their 
core operations, without established practices in, for example, classification becoming a 
central obstacle to sharing information with the parties that need it.
2. Definition of the common interests and objectives concerning the security 
environment and a common interpretation  
Identifying the key development lines in the security environment, and the definition 
of the common interests and objectives of the security actors based on this, or shared 
envisioning, are seen as important areas of development. With regard to interests, it 
must be determined whether these are sufficiently uniform among the different 
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security actors in order for the interests to be made concrete in the elimination of 
the root causes of the problems, such as the immigration crisis, and in taking control 
of their impacts. In today's security environment, the experience is, for example, that the 
connection between development aid and the objectives of the member states does not 
function in its current form, which is in part a consequence of the internal and external 
relations of the EU being projected in national level activities. 
Defining and weighting the key security threats, and the open-minded examination 
of potential new security threats, form an essential part of the definition of common 
interests. The different levels of definition require a broad inclusion of the different 
actors in society as part of the security discussion, so that the impacts of phenomena 
with complex causations, as factors generating insecurity in society, can be taken into 
consideration across the board. Coordinating scenario work that is comprehensively 
inclusive of the different actors in society, for example, and the insertion of the focus 
areas brought up during the scenario work back into the strategic decision-making 
processes, are seen as means of being inclusive.
The essential nature of a common interpretation of the security environment has 
come up in connection with the phenomena that have had a widespread and central 
impact on the development of the security environment. The immigration crisis is an 
example of one of the most central phenomena that caused an intricate challenge to the 
parties operating in the security context; the escalation of the situation into a large-scale 
wave of asylum-seekers still proved to be a surprise, although information on and clues to 
the situation developing into a widespread phenomenon already existed when examined 
on a longer time scale. The security authorities have formed situational awareness mainly 
based on the interpretation of their own information, but the formation of situational 
awareness based on a common interpretation is still considered to be non-existent. 
In this respect, the development of operational models promoting a common 
interpretation of the security environment, and its more permanent establishment 
as part of the operational culture in the security sector, is seen as a key development 
need in the security context. In this context, a concrete development proposal is put 
forward, in which the formation of a cross-administration situational awareness analysis 
is organised in a systematic manner at the Situation Centre of the Prime Minister's Office, 
from where it is forwarded to the ministries for further interpretation and processing, 
and returned from the ministries to the Situation Centre as input. The organisation of this 
action proposal requires the development of communication models that support 
the means that individual officials have for sharing information they interpret to 
be useful widely to the parties that need it. With regard to development, the future 
target state could be considered to be the creation of a common electronic situational 
awareness system.
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Taking the coordination and responsibility issues of the interpretation into 
consideration forms an essential part of the development measures related to the 
interpretation; these are operating models that include a clear definition of the 
responsibility for interpretation, in addition to implementation measures. In the case 
of preparing for extensive, nationwide disruptions, for example, a clear definition of the 
coordination and interpretation responsibilities is considered to be a key issue, based on 
which the competent authorities can be quickly made operational in the process. 
3. Development of flexible cooperation models
When examined at the national level, there is a small number of security actors with clear 
roles in the operational environment, which has bolstered the development of established 
cooperation models based on mutual familiarity. Extensive security phenomena with 
complex causations, such as hybrid phenomena and cybercrime, challenge the traditional 
operating models with regard to cooperation, and responding to this development 
requires the development of new cooperation models parallel to traditional 
procedures. 
The development of flexible cooperation structures in the security sector, reinforcing 
proactive operations, is seen as a key focus area with regard to future development. 
A transition must be made from point-like cooperation models based on bilateral 
relationships between organisations towards flexible expert network models that 
enable the broad-based inclusion of societal actors in security work, including 
from outside traditional security organisations. The business, social, health care, 
education, and third sectors are examples of factors that have a key impact on the 
functioning of society and the level of welfare, and play a key role as forces maintaining 
societal cohesion, and are thus significant builders of security from within society. 
Through the different segments of society, the concept of security threats related to 
everyday life through internationalisation, for example, such as crime and means to 
prevent it, will expand and form a holistic approach to the complex cause-and-effect 
relationships of the security phenomena, instead of fragmented information. The 
inclusion of key segments of society in the examination of security phenomena, and 
the development of cooperation models with security sector actors based on shared 
expertise, is considered to be necessary in order to respond to the increasingly complex 
challenges of the security environment, and to anticipate the focus areas of development.
4. Improving the flexibility of decision-making  
Increased flexibility is expected of decision-making in the current developments in the 
security environment, in which policies and the definition of measures made once per 
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government term, for example, do not match the development dynamics of the current 
security environment, which requires a systematic analysis of the development 
directions and a readiness to respond based on a situation-specific analysis. Based 
on these viewpoints, the development of operating models increasing flexibility, 
and their establishment as part of the decision-making process, is seen as a key 
development measure related to decision-making.
With regard to decision-making, the linking of practical internal security matters with 
decision-making has been found to be lacking, and reinforcing this connection is seen 
to be among the essential development targets in the security context. In practice, the 
deficient link between the operational level and decision-making in internal security 
has arisen in, for example, civilian crisis management operations, where achieving the 
operational goals requires taking internal security issues into consideration extensively 
with regard to domestic decision-making in the crisis area. The strong projection of EU 
decision-making to national-level decision-making is also found to be a challenge for 
decision-making.
The high development expectations on decision-making also culminate in the 
increasingly stronger linking of impact assessment, or anticipation of the impact of 
decision-making, and follow-up as part of the decision-making process. In the current 
form of decision-making, the impact assessment has been missing partially or entirely, and 
decision-making concerning the measures to be taken after terrorist events, for example, 
is found to have taken place without clear consideration of the contextual practical 
experiences.
5. Improving the up-to-dateness and flexibility of practices related to the definition  
of competence and preparedness
The connection points between internal and external security have increased due 
to global events, but internal and external security legislation and the practices in 
competence, influence, and preparedness have not developed systematically in this 
direction. With respect to legislation, it is considered to be necessary to assess whether 
our national preparedness legislation is sufficiently extensive and up-to-date, when the 
rapid development of the security environment is taken into consideration in relation to, 
for example, the security environment that preceded the current preparedness legislation 
and on which the conclusions concerning the threshold criteria in preparedness 
legislation are based. Relative to the current development of the security environment, a 
critical examination is also required of the up-to-dateness of the practices related to 
preparedness legislation and the preparedness of society in a situation that meets the 
threshold for the adoption of the Emergency Powers Act. On the other hand, the sectors 
also see incentives for the development of the up-to-dateness of legislation, as shown by 
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the legislation review project related to the hybrid threats in the Finnish Border Guard's 
remit, currently ongoing in the Finnish Border Guard. 
The up-to-dateness of practices concerning the competence, information acquisition, 
influence, and preparedness of the national security actors has become a subject 
of examination in security environment development, for example in connection 
with preparedness for terrorism and responding to hybrid threats. In issues related 
to competence, the sectors consider it to be essential that sufficiently broad 
competencies are ensured, so that anticipation and reaction to widespread security 
threats are possible before the threats escalate. Defining responsibility is an essential 
element of competence, particularly in new situations in the security environment, for 
which there are no established solutions and procedures yet. In this context, it could be 
examined, for example,which security actor’s responsibility are those persons among 
asylum seekers who have a security or military expert background. 
Anticipating the development of the security environment, as well as situation-specific 
and rapid responses, require, as a whole, flexible practices that enable the most 
purposeful procedure to be applied based on an interpretation of the situation, 
including in surprising situations. Practices supporting the status quo do not suit the 
current dynamics of security development, in which resolving the threats and challenges 
with multifaceted cause-effect relationships requires an agile and situational way of 
thinking and resolving matters. The situational application of the most purposeful 
procedure requires up-to-date communication: deficiencies in register data on 
passengers (SIS), for example, make the risk-based implementation of special checks 
of passengers more difficult, while causing unnecessary delays to passenger traffic as a 
whole.
In these examinations, it is also a question of flexibility of dimensioning; the volume of 
the wave of asylum seekers has challenged practices dimensioned for small volumes, as 
the unexpected, large, and simultaneous need for reception centres has shown. Flexible 
procedures promote the ability and readiness of security actors to act in a proactive 
manner in the increasingly complex operational environment.
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6  Conclusions
The objective of the Ministry of the Interior's research project on the interdependence 
of internal and external security has been to establish an organised and in-depth 
overall idea of the increased dependence of internal and external security, and to 
produce concrete action proposals to develop the operational prerequisites and 
cooperation of the security actors to better match the changed security environment. 
The project's definitive frame of reference is a process for the preparation of an internal 
security strategy; the overall interdependence and development perspectives of internal 
and external strategy formed during the project will be integrated into inputs for this 
process. The International Affairs Unit of the Ministry of the Interior has acted as the 
responsible executor of the project, and the focus of its execution has been in cross-
administration cooperation among the different sectors of the Ministry of the Interior, 
and more specifically the police, the Finnish Border Guard, the rescue services, the Crisis 
Management Centre, the immigration administration, and the Emergency Response 
Centre Administration, and at ministerial level, between the Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The key methods for formulating a shared idea and producing 
development perspectives have been cross-administration workshops and interviews with 
public officials essential to the project's subject.
The state of the global security environment in its current form, and the changes that 
have occurred in it, is projected onto the internal security status and development of 
states in an increasingly complex and in-depth manner. Internal and external security 
are intertwined on multiple levels as a complex whole comprising various cause-
effect relationships and their combinations. As a result of this development, internal 
and external security can no longer be told apart. The global security situation is affected 
by wide-ranging phenomena with complex formation mechanisms, such as terrorism 
and related radicalisation and recruitment, organised crime, widespread immigration, 
cybercrime, and influencing security through hybrid phenomena. Common denominators 
for these heterogeneous phenomena are the complexity of their formation mechanisms, 
the complexity of their mutual causations, and the extensive nature of their societal 
impacts. 
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Examined from Finland's perspective, the root causes of the phenomena changing 
the security context, and the forces driving the development, are often located 
far beyond Finland's national borders. The widespread immigration into Europe, 
escalated by the wars in Central Asia and poor subsistence, is an example of a 
phenomenon that has had a significant impact on the internal security of European 
countries and that has, through its intensity, challenged the procedures and solutions 
established in the traditional security environment. The changed situation and the 
development of the security environment thus require the security actors to possess 
a processual examination method in order to be able to examine the causes and 
consequences of the phenomena comprehensively, matching the strategic planning and 
the adaptation and further development of the operational practices.
The rapidity and increase in complexity that are characteristic of developments in 
the security environment increase the importance of internal security and require 
the development of functions to match the changes in the context. Key factors in the 
development of operations are the systematic and comprehensive examination of the 
operational context, and a focus on the development of proactive operating models 
providing broad support for anticipation and preparedness. The objective of the 
development is to use a systematic analysis of the cause-effect relationships of the 
phenomena to generate meaningful and long-term information to be used as a tool 
in strategic planning and in focusing operations. The meaningful information created 
in the frame of reference of the operational context is based on communication 
between the actors and the shared meanings produced therein, enabling the 
creation of a cross-sector shared perspective and an understanding of the security 
phenomena requiring a broad base of operations. At a concrete level, this means 
perceiving security extensively as a combined result of the actors producing welfare, 
stability, and security for society, and the construction of cooperation models and 
cultural practices based on this foundation.
Corresponding to previous viewpoints, the project process has emphasised the strong 
integration and commitment of stakeholders affecting the security of society at 
different levels as part of the broad-based security work. Operations essential to the 
welfare and cohesion of society, such as the operations of the business, social and health 
care, educational, and third sectors, affect security and its development with different 
causations and in many different types of combinations. The ability to combine the 
expertise and instruments of the different societal sectors in the activities of 
traditional security institutions is emphasised in the increasingly complex operational 
environment, where meeting security challenges requires a cross-sector and horizontal 
way of operating. Corresponding to this examination, the overall chain concept of 
security based on the systemic examination of the context and its phenomena, and the 
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development and harmonisation of dialogue and cooperation models between 
national and international actors, lie at the core of establishing a new operational culture.
Based on the project process, there are five main levels of development proposals 
concerning the prerequisites and cooperation for activities of security actors: 1) 
development of the usability and shareability of information, 2) definition and 
shared interpretation of shared interests and goals concerning the security 
environment, 3) development of flexible cooperation models, 4) improvement of 
the flexibility of decision-making, and 5) improvement of the up-to-dateness and 
flexibility of the practices related to the definition of jurisdiction, and preparedness. 
In the information usability and shareability segment, the development proposals are 
linked to the development of operating models, reinforcing the availability and more 
equal communication of key national and international information among security 
actors. Updating legislation on the availability and usability of information to match 
the transformed security environment was also seen as a key area of development. 
There has already been some positive development in this segment, as shown by the 
communication practices improved as a result of the refugee crisis, and it is hoped that 
these improved practices will promote development in communications in the wider 
sense of the operational culture.
The importance of efficient and up-to-date communications has increased due to the 
rapid changes in the security environment. Correspondingly, the concrete development 
proposals are connected to the systematic development and reinforcement 
of unofficial information exchange channels and operating models between 
organisations. The development of the operating models must take into consideration 
both short-term models focusing on immediate responses, and long-term models 
supporting anticipation and preparedness. The staff rotation in central government is a 
successful example of a practice used to develop a cross-sector view of the security 
work produced by the organisations, promote the networking of experts in different 
fields, and support learning across the borders of operational cultures, observed in the 
long term. The cross-administration expert groups of the "shared interest group" 
type, formed around key security phenomena in a need-based and spontaneous manner, 
also support resolving acute security challenges in the short term. The development and 
establishment of operating models of a similar type, suitable for both short and long-term 
examination as part of the organisational culture, is seen as a key measure that would 
develop information transfer and familiarity between organisations, and is recommended 
for the future.
Other concrete development measures promoting information sharing and usability 
for security actors included the compilation of sector-specific register data into 
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more broad-based data pools; a more critical examination of practices limiting the 
availability of documents, based on a means test; and the updating of distribution 
lists of experts, with clarification on responsibilities for updating. These concrete 
development recommendations will promote an operational culture that bolsters the 
horizontal movement of information from its sources to the parties that need it in the 
development of their key functions.
A shared definition and interpretation of the interests and objectives concerning 
the security environment are central when examined from the perspective of 
the formation of shared situational awareness, anticipation, and measures. The 
development recommendation concerning the definition of common interests is based 
on the assumption that the security actors must be able to define sufficiently uniform 
interests in the case of widespread security phenomena, such as the refugee crisis, in 
order to influence the root causes of the phenomena and to define and agree on the most 
purposeful procedures. The development and establishment of operational models 
reinforcing the shared contextual interpretation by security actors, as part of the 
operational culture, is a concrete development recommendation with respect to forming 
shared situational awareness that is strategically important for operations. Concrete 
means for achieving the target state proposed with regard to the project include the 
development of a shared electronic situational awareness system, and the clear 
definition of the party that is responsible for the shared interpretation and that 
directs its coordination.
The development of flexible cooperation models aims to develop forms of cooperation 
that are of a new type and adaptive, and that support anticipation, alongside 
traditional forms. At a concrete level, the development means the creation of flexible 
and network-like cooperation models, through which the broad integration 
of different societal actors into security work, including from outside security 
organisations, becomes possible. Key parties in the cooperation include the business, 
social, health care, education, and association sectors. Cooperation with actors who 
have a key impact on the welfare and resilience of society enables the broad-based 
examination of the challenges concerning the security environment, meeting these 
challenges, and the anticipation of and preparation for future developments. 
In the current form of security environment development, it is considered to be advisable 
to develop procedures that promote a deeper connection between the systematic 
analysis of the operational environment and response readiness in decision-making. 
The closer linking of practical issues of internal security as part of decision-making forms a 
key element in the context of developing the flexibility of decision-making. At a concrete 
level, the need for development appears, for example, in civilian crisis management 
operations where the long-term stabilisation of the situation and development of the 
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crisis area require a comprehensive examination of internal security issues and the 
inclusion of the responsible actors in short-term operations and long-term development 
work. Decision-making concerning operations and development must be closely linked 
to anticipating the impact of the decision-making and a systematic assessment of 
the effects of the decision-making.
The increased connection points between internal and external security have not, thus 
far, become concrete in the systematic development of internal and external security 
legislation, or in competence, influence, and preparedness practices. With respect to 
legislation, the development needs are related, for example, to the updating of national 
preparedness legislation to match the current security environment. Competence-related 
development needs are connected to ensuring sufficiently extensive competencies 
in order to anticipate broad security threats and to respond to them before the 
situation escalates. Sufficient competencies particularly concern new security threats 
for which procedures and models have not yet been established. 
The rapidly changing security environment makes it increasingly challenging to anticipate 
developments, and solutions concerning procedures have to be made more often 
based on an immediate situational analysis and interpretation. Corresponding to this 
development, the development recommendation of the project is the development 
of flexible practices that enable rapid and adaptive procedures and practices, 
and preparedness for surprising situations. The development of procedures based 
on situational interpretation requires efficient communications, flexibility in the 
dimensioning of the resources as needed, and the flexibility to adapt the operations as a 
rapid response, according to an interpretation of the progress of the process.
In summary, it can be stated that the multi-sector connections between internal and 
external security and the increasingly rapid changes in the security environment force 
security actors to anticipate developments, and to analyse in a more proactive and 
comprehensive manner the phenomena that have complex cause-effect relationships and 
that affect security. In addition to the security authorities, the responsibility for producing 
security for society in its wider meaning belongs to many parties producing security for 
society via welfare and the cohesion of society, such as the business, social and health 
care, educational, and third sectors. A systematic and analytical overall examination of 
security operations, and the comprehensive development and harmonisation of dialogue 
and cooperation models between international and national actors, are necessary to meet 
the current and future challenges in security development. 
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Table 1. Action recommendations of the Interdependence of Internal and External Security research project
1. Development of the 
usability and shareability 
of information
2. Definition of the 
common interests and 
objectives concerning the 
security environment and 
a common interpretation
3. Development of flexible 
cooperation models
4. Improving the flexibility 
of decision-making
5. Improving the up-to-
dateness and flexibility 
of practices related to the 
definition of competence 
and preparedness
Development of 
possibilities for the 
acquisition of information 
from international sources 
and communications
Common identification of 
the security environment's 
key lines of development, 
and the common 
definition of the necessary 
measures
Development of flexible 
cooperation models 
that better support 
proactiveness and better 
match the development 
of the operational 
environment alongside 
traditional models
Development and 
establishment of 
operating models that 
increase flexibility in the 
decision-making process
Update of the internal 
and external security 
legislation and practices 
concerning competence
Development of national 
legislation to better match 
the current operational 
environment
Definition and weighting 
of key security threats 
and the open-minded 
examination of new 
security threats
Flexible expert networks 
that enable the broad-
based inclusion of 
different societal sectors in 
security work
Closer linking of 
the practical-level 
examinations as part 
of the decision-making 
process
Ensuring sufficiently wide 
competencies for the 
security actors in order to 
prevent security threats in 
their current form
Bolstering of operating 
models supporting 
unofficial information 
exchange; for example, 
expert forums of the 
shared interest group type
Broad inclusion of 
different societal actors 
in the definition of the 
focus areas of security 
environment development
Reinforcing the position 
of the business, social and 
health care, education, 
and organisational sectors 
in the examination of 
security environment 
development
Stronger linking of impact 
assessment in decision-
making and follow-up 
as part of the decision-
making process
Development of flexible 
practices that enable the 
application of the most 
purposeful procedure 
based on an interpretation 
of the situation 
Low-threshold operating 
models for raising 
ideas related to the 
development of the 
security context
Forming situational 
awareness based on a 
shared interpretation, 
and developing operating 
models to support it, such 
as a common electronic 
situational awareness 
system
Open-minded 
development of 
cooperation models based 
on shared expertise
Systematic development 
and harmonisation of 
agile and situational ways 
of thinking and resolving 
matters as procedures 
for the different security 
actors
Combination of sector-
specific register data into 
more extensive database 
pools
Clear definition of 
responsibility and 
coordination issues in 
the interpretation of 
situational awareness
Development of the 
flexibility of dimensioning, 
for example concerning 
the flood of asylum 
seekers
Increasingly critical and 
case-specific assessment 
of the limitations on the 
usability of documents
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